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THE INNOCENCE EFFECT
OREN GAZAL-AYAL† AND AVISHALOM TOR††
ABSTRACT
Nearly all felony convictions—about 95 percent—follow guilty
pleas, suggesting that plea offers are very attractive to defendants
compared to trials. Some scholars argue that plea bargains are too
attractive and should be curtailed because they facilitate the wrongful
conviction of innocents. Others contend that plea bargains only
benefit innocent defendants, providing an alternative to the risk of a
harsher sentence at trial. Hence, even while heatedly disputing their
desirability, both camps in the debate believe that plea bargains
commonly lead innocents to plead guilty. This Article shows,
however, that the belief that innocents routinely plead guilty is
overstated. We provide varied empirical evidence for the hitherto
neglected “innocence effect,” revealing that innocents are significantly
less likely to accept plea offers that appear attractive to similarly
situated guilty defendants.
The Article further explores the psychological causes of the
innocence effect and examines its implications for plea bargaining.
Positively, we identify the striking “cost of innocence,” wherein
innocents suffer harsher average sanctions than similarly situated
guilty defendants. Yet our findings also show that the innocence effect
directly causes an overrepresentation of the guilty among plea
bargainers and an overrepresentation of the innocent among those
who choose trial. In this way, the innocence effect beneficially reduces
the rate of wrongful convictions—including accepted plea bargains—
even when compared to a system that does not allow plea bargaining.
Normatively, our analysis finds that both detractors and supporters of
plea bargaining should reevaluate, if not completely reverse, their
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long-held positions to account for the causes and consequences of the
innocence effect. The Article concludes by outlining two proposals for
minimizing false convictions, better protecting the innocent, and
improving the plea bargaining process altogether by accounting for
the innocence effect.
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INTRODUCTION
Plea bargaining dominates the criminal-justice landscape in the
United States. About 95 percent of felony convictions follow guilty
1
2
pleas, and most guilty pleas result from plea bargaining. Despite
their ubiquity and key role in facilitating convictions, however, the
desirability of plea bargains is hotly debated, not least because plea
3
bargains can lead innocent defendants to plead guilty.
Most scholars—whether detractors or supporters of this
practice—examine plea bargaining as a decision process that
4
defendants must undertake in the looming shadow of trial. Plea

1. THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 228944, STATE COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS, 2006: FELONY
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at 1 (2010), available at http://bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/fdluc06.pdf. In the federal courts, 97 percent of felony convictions follow guilty
pleas. See MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
234184, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2009, at 12 tbl.9 (2011), available at http://bjs.ojp.
usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs09.pdf.
2. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV.
29, 30 (2002). Although guilty pleas commonly follow explicit plea bargains, they sometimes
follow an implicit bargain. Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part
I, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 1059, 1059 n.1 (1976). In these cases, defendants plead guilty without
explicit negotiation but with the understanding that they will receive a sentence discount for
waiving their right to trial. Cf. id. at 1076 (noting that in some plea-bargaining systems, “express
pretrial bargaining need not occur at all; the judges simply sentence defendants who are
convicted at trial more severely than defendants who plead guilty”). For the present purposes,
however, the key observation is that guilty pleas universally occur against an institutional
backdrop that equally encourages all similarly situated defendants—whether innocent or
guilty—to plead guilty to obtain a plea discount.
3. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV.
50, 60 (1968) (arguing that “the greatest pressures to plead guilty are brought to bear on
defendants who may be innocent”); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2494–96 (2004) (arguing that information deficits might lead
innocent defendants to plead guilty).
4. Many scholars describe a type of cost-benefit analysis that defendants go through when
deciding whether to plead guilty or to stand trial and not a process in which the actual
responsibility is the decisive factor. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 3, at 61–62 (discussing how
innocent defendants accept very lenient guilty-plea offers to avoid a risky trial); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 313–16, 320
(1983) (laying out reasons for the ubiquity of plea bargaining and the frequency of guilty pleas);
John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 15 (1978) (arguing that
innocent defendants might plead guilty to avoid the trial penalty, just as innocent defendants in
medieval Europe confessed to escape torture); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice
Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 72–73 (1988) (showing how innocent
defendants can be encouraged to plead guilty when the plea offer is adjusted to the probability
of conviction and expected post-trial sentence); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as a Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1935–49 (1992) (illustrating how plea bargaining
may lead innocent defendants to plead guilty); Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End
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bargains are agreements wherein prosecutors offer defendants a
reduction in criminal charges or sentence recommendations or in
which courts offer sentence concessions in return for guilty pleas.
When faced with a plea offer, a defendant must determine whether he
or she finds its certain but discounted sanction more attractive than
trial. In the simplest shadow-of-trial model, for example, defendants
accept plea bargains that offer sanctions lower than the expected
value of trial, which is calculated as the anticipated sentence in the
case of a conviction at trial multiplied by the probability of such a
5
conviction.
Shadow-of-trial scholarship assumes that defendants’ culpability
has no bearing on plea-bargaining behavior beyond the effect that
6
culpability already exerts on the probability of conviction. To
illustrate, imagine a guilty defendant facing, based on the existing
evidence, an 80 percent probability of conviction at trial and ten years
of imprisonment if convicted. In the shadow of this looming sentence,
the defendant is very likely to find attractive, for instance, a
7
prosecutor’s offer to plead guilty in return for a two-year sentence.
Yet the extant shadow-of-trial literature further presumes that our
of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 88–99 (2005) (discussing the
development of and rationale for plea bargaining and noting the high percentage of guilty pleas
in adjudicated cases in federal courts).
5. Although this is the basic structure of shadow-of-trial analyses, actual models typically
take into account additional factors like risk aversion, which we discuss infra Part II.B.3, and the
cost of trial, which does not affect the present analysis and which we therefore do not discuss
further here; cf., e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargaining and Social
Welfare, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 749, 757 (1983) (“[A] welfare-theoretic argument in favor of plea
bargaining need not be based on a consideration of the resource cost of trial proceedings.”). But
see William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61, 99–100 (1971)
(summarizing the role of trial costs in plea bargaining).
6. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1984
(1992) (“Innocence by itself (that is, apart from its link to particular evidence) can have only a
small impact on the odds of conviction.”); cf. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 316 (“It is only from
observing trials that the prosecutor and defendant may infer the probable outcome of pending
cases in order to bargain.”). Some scholars have noted in passing that innocence might play an
independent role, but none have developed the argument further or provided evidence of the
role that innocence plays. For example, Professor William Landes argues that
[t]he question of whether the defendant did in fact commit the crime he is charged
with does not explicitly enter the analysis. The prosecutor and defendant have been
assumed to react to the probability of conviction and other variables in choosing
between settling and going to trial, while their behavior has not been directly
influenced by the actual guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Landes, supra note 5, at 68–69. Yet, Landes also notes—without much further explanation—
that innocents might be averse to lying and hence less willing to plea. Id. at 69.
7. More precisely, the defendant’s propensity to accept the plea offer will depend on his
risk preferences. For further detail, see infra notes 97–101 and accompanying text.
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hypothetical defendant would be as likely to plea bargain if she were
innocent rather than guilty. After all, shadow-of-trial models assume
that the expected sanction at trial is the only case-related variable that
determines whether a defendant will plea bargain. A defendant’s
actual innocence, on the other hand, should have no direct bearing on
this process.
Opponents and proponents of plea bargaining commonly believe
that defendants’ culpability has little effect on the overall rate of plea
bargaining. These scholars reason that prosecutors use their
discretion to adjust plea offers based on the probability of conviction,
8
making more lenient offers in weak cases to guarantee agreement.
Defendants who face weaker cases—such as most innocents—simply
are offered more lenient sentences that make plea bargaining as
9
attractive as it is for defendants in stronger cases. Hence, innocents

8. See Grossman & Katz, supra note 5, at 752 (showing that unless the post-trial sentence
is much higher than what would be socially desirable, prosecutors adjust the plea offer to the
harshest sanction that the defendant is willing to accept based on the probability of conviction);
Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1946 (“[P]rosecutors must take into account the odds of
acquittal when making plea offers. Thus, defendants who can . . . point to evidence that supports
their innocence claims can either obtain a dismissal or a favorable plea offer.”). Note that in
weak cases the parties must rely on charge bargaining, in which the prosecutor removes or
reduces the charges in return for the guilty plea to avoid judicial rejection of the agreed-upon
sentence. See Wright & Miller, supra note 2, at 32–33 (“Without careful initial screening, the
prosecuting trial attorney who refuses to negotiate for reduced charges faces the risk of
acquittals . . . .”). Indeed, rather than being the exception, charge bargaining in weak cases is the
norm in the criminal-justice system. See Dean J. Champion, Private Counsels and Public
Defenders: A Look at Weak Cases, Prior Records, and Leniency in Plea Bargaining, 17 J. CRIM.
JUST. 253, 257 (1989) (surveying 166 city and county prosecutors and noting that their responses
“indicated an overwhelming propensity to moderate the harshness of plea bargain terms to
defendants if the government had a weak case against them”).
9. See supra note 6. Moreover, although most cases against innocents will be weak and
therefore dismissed at earlier stages, once a decision to prosecute a weak case has been made,
plea bargaining should be even more likely, as there are many indications that prosecutors will
go a long way to avoid losing cases. See Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the
Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1045–46
(1972) (concluding, based on interviews with federal prosecutors, that convictions are the
central performance standard and that an increased rate of nonconvictions raises questions and
creates anxieties); see also Alschuler, supra note 3, at 106–07 (noting that prosecutors are often
evaluated by the rate of convictions and thus care much more about conviction than
sentencing); Bibas, supra note 3, at 2471 (“[Prosecutors] may further their careers by racking up
good win-loss records, in which every plea bargain counts as a win but trials risk being losses.”).
Therefore, because they are more concerned about handling a full-fledged trial when the case is
weak, prosecutors make a greater effort to assure that a plea bargain is struck. We should thus
find, if anything, higher rates of plea bargaining among those weaker cases that nevertheless are
prosecuted, in which innocents are likely to be overrepresented.
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may accept a discounted plea offer and plead guilty rather than risk
10
trial, despite facing a weaker case than many guilty defendants.
Although nearly all scholars unquestioningly accept the
conclusion that plea bargaining routinely brings about wrongful
convictions, they reach diametrically opposing views regarding the
desirability of the practice. Many commentators find that plea
bargaining is problematic and argue for its curtailment because of this
11
“innocence problem.” Other scholars favor the practice, contending
that plea bargaining can only benefit those innocents who prefer the
discounted bargain to the risk of a much harsher sentence following a
12
wrongful conviction at trial.
10. For a thorough review of the law-and-economics literature on plea bargaining, see
Oren Gazal-Ayal & Limor Riza, Plea-Bargaining and Prosecution, in 3 CRIMINAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS 145 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009). For some of the more prominent articles, see
sources cited supra note 4.
11. Professor Albert Alschuler has noted that many plea-bargaining advocates
[A]pparently perceive no difference between, on the one hand, a system in which
each of ten innocent but risk-averse defendants senses a ten percent chance of
conviction at trial and accepts a sentence of one year and, on the other hand, a system
in which nine innocent defendants are acquitted at trial while one, wrongly convicted,
is sentenced to ten years. In both situations . . . the legal system has yielded the same
number of years of unwarranted imprisonment. There may, however, be a difference
between these situations apart from the greater number of wrongful convictions
produced by a system of plea bargaining—the difference between a criminal-justice
system that tries to find the truth and sometimes fails and one that apparently does
not care.
Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 652, 713–14
(1981); see also Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal Justice and the Negotiated Plea, 86 ETHICS 93, 98–99
(1976) (comparing a prosecutor’s plea offer to coercing someone to act at gunpoint); Langbein,
supra note 4, 12–13 (likening plea bargaining to medieval torture and observing that “[w]e
coerce the accused against whom we find probable cause to confess his guilt” by “threaten[ing]
him with a materially increased sanction if he avails himself of his right [to trial] and is
thereafter convicted”); Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1981–91 (rejecting Scott and Stuntz’s
bargain-theory conception of the “innocence problem,” Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, but
highlighting other problems with plea bargaining (internal quotation marks omitted)); Welsh S.
White, A Proposal for Reform of the Plea Bargaining Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 450–51
(1971) (“Prosecutorial inducement of guilty pleas in weak cases . . . poses potentially serious
problems.”); Wright, supra note 4, at 113 (“A trial distortion theory does not imply that there is
a particular level of acquittals that is healthy or unhealthy; acquittals become a point of concern
not simply when they become too high or low in absolute terms, but also when they change
persistently in one direction.”).
12. See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA L. REV. 1117, 1170–78 (2007)
(“[T]here exists a marked disconnect between systemic fact and hollow ideals when it comes to
guilt and innocence. . . . [T]here is no good reason to act in deference to empty principles that
ignore the realities of punishment and serve no practical purposes other than compelling the
undeserved innocent accused to bear unwelcome process or trial-penalty risk.”); Thomas W.
Church, Jr., In Defense of “Bargain Justice,” 13 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 516 (1979) (“The
problem with the case against plea bargaining from the perspective of the factually innocent
defendant is that the critics seem to assume that such blameless defendants are necessarily

GAZAY-AYAL & TOR IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE INNOCENCE EFFECT

10/19/2012 2:02 PM

345

This Article reveals, however, that the prevailing scholarly views
on culpability and plea bargaining are mistaken. Instead, the
empirical evidence that we present reveals a distinct, yet hitherto
13
neglected, “innocence effect” in plea bargaining, in which culpability
exerts a strong influence on defendants’ willingness to accept plea
offers and, consequently, on overall plea-bargaining and conviction
rates. Specifically, defedants who exhibit the innocence effect tend to
reject plea offers that similarly situated guilty defendants typically
accept, showing that the pervasive shadow-of-trial assumption that
culpability is irrelevant is plainly wrong. Moreover, our evidence on
the significant effect of innocence on plea behavior demonstrates that
scholars’ related, common belief that plea bargains lead innocents
routinely to make false guilty pleas is overstated.
Although we are not the first to criticize the standard, dominant
shadow-of-trial approach in the criminal arena, our analysis and its
policy implications differ substantially from extant approaches. One
of the main criticisms of the shadow-of-trial model is that defendants’
decisions are too erratic to predict their bargaining strategies because
defendants are irrational, lack the capacity to make calculated
14
decisions, or suffer from inadequate legal representation. This
critique, however, relies mainly on intuition and anecdotes, not on
exonerated at trial.”); Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 320 (“Sometimes the evidence may point to
guilt despite the defendant’s factual innocence. It would do defendants no favor to prevent them
from striking the best deals they could in such sorry circumstances.”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note
4, at 1947 (“Bargaining defendants are, in effect, purchasing insurance from prosecutors,
insurance against the risk of conviction and a high post-trial sentence.”).
13. We were able to find only two psychological studies, one from the late 1970s and the
other from the early 1980s, that examined the influence of innocence in plea bargaining. See
Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Likelihood of Conviction, Threatened Punishment, and
Assumed Role on Mock Plea Bargaining Decisions, 5 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 59
(1984) (analyzing “the decision strategy used by defendants in a plea bargaining situation”
through a role-playing experiment); W. Larry Gregory, John C. Mowen & Darwyn E. Linder,
Social Psychology and Plea Bargaining: Applications, Methodology, and Theory, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1521 (1978) (employing role-playing and involved-participant
procedures “to identify variables that affect the acceptance of a plea bargain”). These earlier
studies are discussed in Parts I.D and II.C infra.
14. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 11, at 664 (stating that excessive optimism leads
defendants to make wrong decisions); Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1219–22 (1975) (examining how defense attorneys’ biases and
rapport with prosecutors can affect outcomes for defendants); Bibas, supra note 3, at 2476–86
(arguing that defense attorneys may lead defendants to make wrong choices in the pleabargaining process); id. at 2496–2519 (arguing that defendants’ biases lead them to make choices
that diverge from the predictions of the shadow-of-trial model); Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 53–
60 (discussing the effects of the personal interests of defense attorneys); Schulhofer, supra note
6, at 1988–90 (same).
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quantitative empirical studies, and it is at least partly contradicted by
our empirical evidence of the innocence effect, which reveals
innocents’ systematic reluctance to plea. At any rate, the common
criticisms of the shadow-of-trial approach bear very different
normative implications from those that follow from our findings.
More recently, commentators have sought to challenge the
shadow-of-trial approach by applying psychological insights to
16
defendants’ plea behaviors. Although commendable in their efforts
to increase the realism and efficacy of plea-bargaining scholarship,
these challenges are nonetheless of mixed quality, lacking direct
evidence of plea behavior and occasionally manifesting a limited
17
familiarity with the precise contours of the psychological evidence.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, none of these behaviorally informed
contributions have identified the innocence effect.
In a similar vein, the extensive research on procedural fairness
reveals limitations of the shadow-of-trial model besides those that we
18
examine here. Procedural-fairness studies show that defendants’
satisfaction with the criminal process, as well as the public’s
willingness to accept its legitimacy more generally, depend not only

15. For example, one leading critic of the shadow-of-trial model based his findings on
unstructured talks with court participants, a methodology he called “legal journalism.”
Alschuler, supra note 14, at 1181; Alschuler, supra note 3, at 52.
16. See Bibas, supra note 3, at 2467 (“[T]he shadow-of-trial model assumes that the actors
are fundamentally rational. Recent scholarship on negotiation and behavioral law and
economics, however, undercuts this strong assumption of rationality. Instead, overconfidence,
self-serving biases, framing, denial mechanisms, anchoring, discount rates, and risk preferences
all skew bargains.”); see also Richard Birke, Reconciling Loss Aversion and Guilty Pleas, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 205 (“This Article proposes and examines four hypotheses that attempt to
reconcile the rate of guilty pleas and the [cognitive-psychology] principle of loss aversion.”);
Russell Covey, Reconsidering the Relationship Between Cognitive Psychology and Plea
Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV. 213 (2007) (examining “why plea bargaining is so prevalent
notwithstanding the existence of plea-discouraging cognitive bias”); Rebecca HollanderBlumoff, Social Psychology, Information Processing, and Plea Bargaining, 91 MARQ. L. REV.
163 (2007) (“This essay begins to explore psychological research on how motivation and the
effects of social factors can affect information processing to shed light on such processing in the
plea bargaining setting.”).
17. For example, Professor Stephanos Bibas argues that “[p]rosecutorial bluffing is likely
to work particularly well against innocent defendants, who are on average more risk averse than
guilty defendants.” Bibas, supra note 3, at 2495. We find significant evidence to the contrary,
however. Cf. Avishalom Tor, The Methodology of the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 4 HAIFA L.
REV. 237, 275–81 (2008) (discussing the value and limitations of theoretical applications of
extra-legal behavioral evidence to the law).
18. For review of this literature by one of its most important contributors, see generally
Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117 (2000).
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on the results of the process but also on its perceived fairness. Our
inquiry is distinct from the procedural-fairness literature in three
respects, however. First, we focus on the ultimate plea offer and its
acceptance or rejection instead of on the process that generates the
offer. Second, our analysis examines not only defendants’ perceptions
but also their actual plea behavior. Third, and significantly, our
findings reveal a phenomenon that systematically distinguishes the
innocent from the guilty, beyond the various behavioral factors—
procedural-fairness concerns included—that similarly affect all
defendants.
The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I reviews a diverse body
of evidence for the innocence effect, including retrospective studies of
convicts, empirical analyses of field data on wrongfully convicted
defendants who were later exonerated, and controlled experimental
studies of plea behavior. Part II then examines the causes of the
innocence effect. It considers alternative accounts for our field data,
explores the psychological antecedents of the effect by drawing on
relevant behavioral research in other domains, and supplements this
broader research with more specific findings from experimental tests
of plea bargaining.
Part III develops the positive and normative implications of the
innocence effect and its psychological antecedents. Positively, we
reveal the counterintuitive, striking cost of innocence: innocent
defendants suffer harsher average sanctions than their similarly
situated guilty counterparts. At the same time, however, our findings
also show that the innocence effect causes the overrepresentation of
the guilty among plea bargainers and of the innocent among those
choosing trial, with the beneficial consequence of reducing the overall
rate of wrongful convictions.
Normatively, Part III shows that plea-bargaining opponents and
proponents alike must reevaluate, if not wholly reverse, their
traditional positions. Specifically, proponents argue that plea
bargaining can only benefit innocents, providing them with an option
to avoid the risk of wrongful conviction at trial and the “trial
penalty”—that is, the excess sentence imposed on convicted
20
defendants who had selected trials instead of pleading guilty. Yet we
show that the innocence effect makes guilty defendants the main
19. See id. at 119–20 (discussing the many ways in which procedural fairness affects
acceptance of a decision, in both criminal cases and other legal processes).
20. See supra note 12.
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beneficiaries of large plea discounts, which leaves innocents—who
disproportionately go to trial—to suffer the heavy trial penalty if they
are wrongfully convicted. Assuming that the interests of innocent
defendants are the relevant normative yardstick, therefore, plea
bargaining should be opposed rather than supported.
Plea-bargaining opponents, on the other hand, emphasize the
need to reduce the rate of wrongful convictions. They argue that plea
bargaining should be curtailed because it leads innocent defendants
21
to plead guilty, thereby causing a miscarriage of justice. We find,
however, that guilty defendants overwhelmingly plead guilty
following a plea bargain, whereas some of those innocents who
disproportionately choose to stand trial due to the innocence effect
are acquitted. Therefore, if the rate of wrongful conviction is the
relevant yardstick, plea bargaining should be encouraged, not
discouraged.
Finally, in view of the paradoxical normative implications of the
innocence effect, Part III concludes with two proposals of our own for
minimizing false convictions, better protecting the innocent, and
improving the plea bargaining process altogether by accounting for
the innocence effect.
I. EVIDENCE
A diverse body of evidence substantiates the intuitive, if
neglected, innocence effect. Part I.A opens with a brief review of
suggestive retrospective studies in which defendants report that
culpability played a central role in their plea decisions. An empirical
analysis of field data from several hundred wrongfully convicted
defendants who were later exonerated, predominantly in rape and
murder cases, follows in Part I.B. This analysis reveals that only a
small fraction of the wrongful convictions for these severe offenses
followed guilty pleas, in sharp contrast to rape and murder
convictions more generally, which typically result from such pleas.
Part I.C then examines closely the case of the thirty-eight innocent
Tulia defendants, who were convicted for drug trafficking and later
exonerated. The Tulia events, of which we have detailed information,
again show a striking contrast between the reluctance of innocent
defendants to plea bargain and the statistics in comparable criminal
21. See Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1984–85 (“I argue for an old-fashioned conception of
what the ‘innocence problem’ is, and for an old-fashioned kind of remedy—abolition of
bargaining—to solve it.”); supra note 11.
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cases in similar Texas districts. Finally, Part I.D concludes with
evidence of the innocence effect from controlled experiments that
directly manipulated the culpability of participants in both
hypothetical scenarios and more realistic simulations.
A. Post-Plea Interviews
The major challenge facing an attempt to adduce quantitative
evidence of the innocence effect is the difficulty of identifying truly
innocent defendants. Guilty defendants often will proclaim their
innocence, seeking to avoid conviction or obtain a better plea
bargain, whereas innocents may plea bargain when conviction seems
certain and the plea offer appears attractive. Similarly, one cannot
infer the innocence of those few who choose trial from their refusal to
plea bargain. Some guilty defendants may refuse to bargain, whether
in an unsuccessful attempt to secure a better offer, because their plea
offers were not sufficiently attractive, or to avoid the social costs of
admitting their guilt in court. Finally, criminal trials cannot perfectly
separate the guilty from the innocent, which inevitably results in cases
both of mistaken acquittals and of wrongful convictions.
Nevertheless, empirical studies collecting data from defendants
after the conclusion of their criminal proceedings reveal the centrality
of culpability and innocence in defendants’ plea behavior. Although
these retrospective interviews may be tainted by the participating
convicts’ efforts to present themselves in a positive light, they are less
likely than pretrial data to be shaped by defendants’ attempts to
impact the legal result of their already-concluded case.
Interestingly, retrospective studies report that the expected22
sanction considerations on which the shadow-of-trial model is based
are not the most important factors for defendants’ plea-bargain
decisions. Instead, and quite strikingly, many defendants claimed that
they had pleaded guilty first and foremost because they were in fact
23
guilty. In the same vein, almost all convicted defendants who

22. See supra notes 4–5 and accompanying text.
23. A.E. BOTTOMS & J.D. MCCLEAN, DEFENDANTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 111–12 &
tbl.5.7 (1976). Of the defendants in the sample who pleaded guilty, 41 percent explained that
they did so simply because they were guilty, 27 percent pleaded guilty because the police had a
good case against them, 20 percent because they were caught red-handed, 11 percent because
they confessed to the police, 10 percent to end the matter quietly and with less fuss, and 7
percent based on their lawyer’s advice. Only 5 percent said they plea bargained to get a lighter
sentence. Some defendants gave more than one reason. Id. at 112 tbl.5.7; see also SUSANNE
DELL, SILENT IN COURT: THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN WHO WENT TO PRISON
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pleaded “not guilty” at trial claimed either that they did not commit
the offense or that, in their opinion, the act that they had committed
24
did not constitute an offense. Utilitarian considerations, on the other
hand, were far less common: only 10 percent of the defendants cited
the desire to end the proceedings quickly as a major reason for plea
bargaining, and merely 5 percent cited the desire to obtain a lighter
sanction through the plea as the main reason for accepting a plea
25
bargain. In many cases, moreover, defendants who pleaded “not
guilty” told the researchers that had they based their decision on
considerations of expediency, they would have plea bargained rather
26
than gone to trial.
Notably, most defendants in retrospective studies had no
problem presenting themselves in a negative light. That is, the vast
majority of guilty pleaders—which is to say the substantial majority of
27
all defendants —routinely admitted in the survey that they had
committed the offense and even stated that their culpability was the
28
main reason for their guilty plea.
Therefore, although the veracity of retrospective claims of
innocence in post-trial or post-plea surveys may be questionable,
these studies can at least be cited for the proposition that, for most

30–37 (1971) (only about 10 percent of the women who pleaded guilty denied committing the
offense when interviewed after pleading).
24. See BOTTOMS & MCCLEAN, supra note 23, at 130–31.
25. See id. at 112 tbl.5.7.
26. See id. at 132 (“[A] decision to plead not guilty did not imply the expectation of
acquittal: 26 per cent of those convicted and 21 per cent of those acquitted had expected to be
found guilty.”). For a more detailed analysis of this study, see supra note 23. Similar results were
found in an international study that interviewed nearly four hundred defendants immediately
following their plea at the Israeli Magistrate Court. AMI KOBO, INCONSISTENT PLEADERS IN
COURT: PLEADING GUILTY AND CLAIMING TO BE INNOCENT 329–43 (2009). In that study,
most defendants who pleaded guilty (53 percent) reported making their decision to reject the
plea offer either because the indictment that was brought against them was justified or because
they had committed the offense. Only a few defendants who pleaded guilty mentioned
expediency considerations, such as the desire to end the case (10.2 percent), or the deal offered
by a plea bargain, or an expected penalty relief following a guilty plea (11.2 percent). Another
common reason given was being caught red-handed (23.7 percent). Of course, defendants’
responses in the latter study, which were collected before trial concluded, are particularly
susceptible to the criticism that they are distorted or false because defendants might seek to
somehow affect the outcome of the case even while talking privately to researchers outside the
legal proceeding.
27. See supra note 1.
28. See supra notes 23, 26.
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defendants who pleaded guilty, culpability was a significant
29
consideration in making that plea decision.
B. Exoneration Statistics
Suggestive retrospective studies notwithstanding, we sought to
obtain direct, quantitative evidence of the innocence effect. To
overcome the challenge of identifying truly innocent defendants, we
turned to the one group whose innocence is nearly certain:
defendants who were wrongfully convicted and later exonerated.
30
Using data from the Innocence Project and data collected by
31
Professor Samuel Gross and his coauthors, we compiled a dataset of
466 exoneration cases in which a conviction was overturned based on
new information that revealed that the defendant was factually
32
innocent. Of those cases, 284 exonerations resulted from DNA
29. A similar pattern of a strong concern for fairness or justice emerges from the cases
featured in the PBS documentary The Plea, which chronicled individuals who refused to plead
guilty and claimed their innocence despite certain incarceration and extremely attractive plea
offers. Frontline: The Plea (PBS television broadcast 2004), available at http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea. Such was the story of Kelly Jarrett, who rejected an offer to
plead guilty and be set free after having already served about ten years of her sentence of
twenty-five years to life. Jarrett refused the offer on moral grounds, despite knowing that she
was very likely to serve decades more in prison because of this refusal. Similarly, Kerry Max
Cook was twice convicted and sentenced to death for the murder and mutilation of a woman.
When the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals—the highest criminal appeals court in the state—
ordered the lower court to review the case again, the prosecutor offered Cook the chance to
plead guilty in exchange for his immediate release. Despite the risk of another possible death
sentence, Cook refused to plead guilty to a murder he did not commit. It was only after he had
been offered a nolo contendere settlement, which allowed him to maintain his assertion of
innocence, that he accepted the deal that set him free. Two months after the plea bargain, a
DNA test proved that someone else had committed the crime and that Cook, therefore, was
innocent. Id.
30. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/Browse-Profiles.php
(last visited Sept. 22, 2012).
31. Samuel R. Gross, Kristen Jacoby, Daniel J. Matheson, Nicholas Montgomery & Sujata
Patil, Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523
(2005).
32. Originally, we included cases from many other sources, including data from EDWIN
BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: SIXTY-FIVE ACTUAL ERRORS OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE (1932); JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK IN ASSOCIATION WITH HAROLD M.
HOFFMAN, NOT GUILTY (1957); MICHAEL L. RADELET, HUGO ADAM BEDAU & CONSTANCE
E. PUTNAM, IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE: ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992);
EDWARD D. RADIN, THE INNOCENTS (2d prtg. 1964); CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, NW.
L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/cwc (last visited Sept. 22, 2012); INNOCENCE PROJECT
NEW ORLEANS, http://ip-no.org/exonerees-clients (last visited Sept. 22, 2012); JUSTICE DENIED:
MAG. FOR WRONGLY CONVICTED, http://www.justicedenied.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2012);
TRUTH IN JUSTICE, http://www.truthinjustice.org (last visited Sept. 22, 2012); and Wrongly
Convicted Database Index, FOREJUSTICE, http://forejustice.org/db/innocents.html (last visited
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analysis, and the real offender was found in 96 cases. To ensure data
quality and relevance we used only exonerations from 1989 through
33
June 2011. The records in the database were categorized for the
following seven variables: type of felony (mostly rape or murder),
year of wrongful conviction, year of exoneration, sentence, type of
34
conviction (plea or trial), cause of mistaken conviction, and type of
35
exonerating evidence. In cases in which defendants pleaded guilty,
we also added an eighth variable, measuring whether they faced the
threat of a death sentence if convicted at trial.
The quantitative evidence of the innocence effect was dramatic.
The categorized data revealed that only 37 of the 466 exonerated
defendants, or 7.9 percent, were convicted following a guilty plea. The
remaining 92.1 percent were convicted by an erroneous jury decision
at trial. This 7.9 percent rate stands in sharp contrast to the common
rate of guilty pleas in comparable felony cases during the same
36
period, which was approximately 90 percent.

Sept. 22, 2012). To assure a high, consistent standard for inclusion in the database and to ensure
that the cases included are not too old, however, we relied only on data from the INNOCENCE
PROJECT, supra note 30, and Gross et al., supra note 31. We consulted the other sources for
supplementary information regarding the cases that we studied. Seven cases in Gross et al.,
supra note 31, were excluded from our analysis because of insufficient information.
33. Relying on more recent cases reduces the risk that the result is affected by changes in
the criminal-justice system over the years. We note, however, that a larger dataset that also
included older cases generated results similar to those reported here.
34. The causes were eyewitness misidentification (269 cases), expert testimony (60 cases),
police misconduct (77 cases), prosecution misconduct (76 cases), false confessions (67 cases),
false testimony of an informant or another interested party (89 cases), ineffective or no
representation (30 cases), alleged scientific evidence (37 cases), alleged suspicious statement of
the defendant (12 cases), and pre-DNA hair analysis (27 cases). In many cases, more than one
cause led to the miscarriage of justice.
35. The exonerating evidence consisted of DNA (284 cases), real culprit found (96 cases),
solid alibi proved (10 cases), informant reversed testimony (34 cases), and exonerating scientific
evidence other than DNA—such as blood tests, fingerprints, and ballistic tests (13 cases). Three
exonerations followed proof that the crime never happened. In one case, the supposedly stolen
money was found. In another, a couple was exonerated from murdering their baby, who had
never been born. In some cases, more than one type of proof led to the exoneration.
36. See BRIAN A. REAVES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ
205289, STATE COURT PROCESSING STATISTICS, 1990-2002: VIOLENT FELONS IN LARGE
URBAN COUNTIES, 7 tbl.13 (2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vfluc.pdf
(stating that 88 percent of violent felony convictions in the seventy-five largest urban counties
between 1990 and 2002 resulted from guilty pleas). In 1996, 91 percent of state-court felony
convictions followed guilty pleas. JODI M. BROWN, PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 173939, FELONY SENTENCES IN
STATE COURTS, 1996, at 1 (1999), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/
fssc96.pdf. A decade later, the number had increased to 94 percent. SEAN ROSENMERKEL,
MATTHEW DUROSE & DONALD FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
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Intriguingly, many of the innocent defendants in our database
who pleaded guilty to a crime that they did not commit—23 of 67
wrongfully convicted defendants, or 34.3 percent—did so after falsely
confessing to the crime during the police investigation. This result
suggests that guilty pleas following a confession are less reliable than
37
guilty pleas generally. Moreover, the finding demonstrates that the
innocence effect is even stronger when the innocent defendant had
not falsely confessed to the crime during investigation. Only 14
defendants of the 399 exonerees who had not confessed during the
38
police investigation, 3.5 percent, pled guilty.
To get a more nuanced perspective, we also analyzed each of the
common offenses in the database separately. Among the 196 sexual
assault exonerations, only 11, or 5.6 percent, followed a guilty plea—a
figure that is dramatically different from the approximately 85
percent guilty-plea rate among sexual assault convictions during that
39
period. Among murder and manslaughter cases, 16 of the 234
exonerated defendants, 6.8 percent, pled guilty, dramatically less than
40
the 60 percent guilty-plea rate among comparable convictions.
Moreover, 14 of these 16 defendants explained that their guilty plea
had been driven by their fear of capital punishment. Unsurprisingly, it
appears that even innocents are likely to plead guilty when bargaining
is conducted in the shadow of a death sentence.
One possible concern is that the exoneration data does not
reveal whether, in light of the prosecution’s evidence, the plea offers
would have been unattractive even to guilty defendants. We believe

JUSTICE, NCJ 226846, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006, at 1 (2009), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf. In fact, the 99 percent confidence interval
around the 7.9 percent rate in our sample data has a lower bound of 5.6 percent and an upper
bound of 13.4 percent, which highlights the strong tendency of these innocents to opt for a trial.
37. Notably, this important finding does not show that false confessions cause false guilty
pleas. Instead, our data reveal an important correlation between the two behaviors, leaving
open the possibility that some other case characteristic––such as extreme vulnerability of certain
defendants––facilitates both false confessions and false pleading. Although we speculate that
both of the preceding accounts may be true, further empirical investigation in this area is
necessary.
38. The 99 percent confidence interval around the 2.8 percent rate in this sample data has a
lower bound of 1.8 percent and an upper bound of 7.2 percent.
39. In 1996, 81 percent of the convictions in sexual assault cases resulted from guilty pleas.
BROWN ET AL., supra note 36, at 8 tbl.10. In 2006, it was 88 percent. ROSENMERKEL ET AL.,
supra note 36, at 25 tbl.4.1.
40. In 1996, 54 percent of the convictions for murder and non-negligent manslaughter
resulted from guilty pleas. BROWN ET AL., supra note 36, at 7. In 2006, the rate was 61 percent.
ROSENMERKEL ET AL., supra note 36, at 25 tbl.4.1.
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that this concern is of little significance, however, as there is no
reason to believe that prosecutors treated these innocent defendants
differently from their treatment of similar, guilty defendants.
Prosecutors probably believe that all prosecuted defendants are guilty
and dismiss the charges against those who they believe are innocent.
Therefore, prosecutors usually offer defendants plea bargains that
reflect the expected sanction at trial, irrespective of defendants’
41
actual guilt or innocence. Absent an innocence effect, therefore, we
should have observed similar guilty-plea rates for guilty and innocent
defendants.
Another, potentially more significant, concern with the
systematic, pronounced differences between the defendants in our
database and the general convict population is that the exonerated
may consist of a small, self-selected—and therefore nonrepresentative—group of innocents who refuse even attractive offers
and persist in making efforts to prove their innocence following
conviction. According to this account, the behavior of the exonerated
may systematically differ from that of the broader population of
innocent defendants, who accept attractive plea offers, do not seek to
challenge their convictions after pleading guilty, and thus are unlikely
42
to be exonerated.
To examine this possibility, we separately studied the subset of
cases in which the defendants were exonerated after the real offender
had been identified, the type of event that was less likely to depend
on defendants’ efforts to challenge their convictions. Among those
ninety-six cases, only twelve convictions, 12.5 percent, resulted from
guilty pleas.

41. See Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 297 (“As the sentence on conviction and the
probability of conviction rise, so does the prosecutor’s minimum demand.”); Schulhofer, supra
note 6, at 1984 (“Offers and reservation prices depend on the likelihood of conviction, which, in
turn, is governed primarily by the admissible evidence available to the prosecution and
defense. . . . Innocence by itself (that is, apart from its link to particular evidence) can have only
a small impact on the odds of conviction.”); see also Alschuler, supra note 3, at 52 (“[T]he
prosecutor must estimate the sentence that seems likely after a conviction at trial, discount this
sentence by the possibility of an acquittal, and balance the ‘discounted trial sentence’ against the
sentence he can insure through a plea agreement.”); Oren Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea
Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295, 2298–99 (2006) (discussing the impact of plea bargaining
on a prosecutor’s decision whether to prosecute a case at all).
42. See C. RONALD HUFF, ARYE RATTNER & EDWARD SAGARIN, CONVICTED BUT
INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICTION AND PUBLIC POLICY 73 (1996) (arguing that usually,
when wrongful convictions result from a guilty plea “there is no continued aftermath, no
investigation, no exoneration”).

GAZAY-AYAL & TOR IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE INNOCENCE EFFECT

10/19/2012 2:02 PM

355

Because it is conceivable that even this subset of exonerations
still partly reflects the contribution of plea-refusing innocents’ efforts,
however, we sought those rare instances in which this selection effect
is particularly unlikely. For this purpose, we examined a broader
exonerations dataset, spanning from the beginning of the twentieth
43
century through June 2011, which included seven murder defendants
who had been exonerated after the supposed murder victim was
44
found to be alive. In one additional theft case, the defendant had
45
been exonerated after the supposedly stolen money was found. Each
of these eight defendants—whose efforts could not have contributed
46
to the exoneration—pleaded not guilty, providing a further
illustration of the innocence effect.
Beyond its apparently limited manifestation in our exoneration
dataset, moreover, the selection-bias argument fails to account for the
remarkable reluctance to plea bargain that was exhibited by the Tulia
defendants, whose exonerations resulted from no effort of their own.
C. The Tulia Dataset
Another dataset that shows the innocence effect at work
concerns the criminal prosecution, conviction, and later exoneration
of a large group of defendants in the small town of Tulia, Texas. This
dataset is particularly instructive for a number of reasons. First, it
involves drug-trafficking cases, thereby expanding the range of
offenses covered by our other exoneration data, which otherwise
consist almost solely of murder and rape cases. Second, the
quantitative data we have for the thirty-eight Tulia defendants is
further complemented by rich, qualitative documentation of these
innocents’ plea-bargain decision-making processes. Third, and
importantly, the effects of selection bias—which could not be ruled
out completely with respect to our general exoneration data

43. Because the cases in our database included no exonerations resulting from the
appearance of the supposed murder victim, we examined here the larger database of 973 cases
from the twentieth- and twenty-first centuries that we compiled originally. See supra note 32.
44. These include the cases of Bill Wilson, Alabama, 1915; Louise Butler and George
Yelder, Alabama, 1928; Antonio Rivera and Merla Walpole, California, 1973; Condy Dabney,
Kentucky, 1926; and Ernest Lyons, Virginia, 1909. Exonerations in All States, CTR. ON
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, NW. L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/
exonerations/usIndex.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2012). The full story of Ernest Lyons can be
found in BORCHARD, supra note 32, at 144–48.
45. Gross et al., supra note 31, at 536 n.28.
46. Exonerations in All States, supra note 44.
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presented in Part I.B—are absent from the Tulia cases because we
know that the defendants’ efforts played no role in their later
47
exonerations.
The Tulia cases took place when one corrupt, undercover police
officer successfully framed thirty-eight people in allegedly
48
independent cases of drug trafficking. A few years after their
respective convictions, however, these innocents were exonerated and
49
compensated, and the officer was convicted of perjury. The behavior
of these unrelated, innocent defendants, who each knew that a police
50
officer would testify at trial that he or she sold him cocaine, is telling.
The first eight defendants, who were brought to trial consecutively,
were unwilling to plea bargain. They were sentenced after jury trials
to various prison terms, ranging from 20 to 434 years of
51
imprisonment.
Among the eight defendants was Joe Moore, who rejected his
lawyer’s repeated advice to plea bargain, even though he was told he
52
would not be able to challenge the officer’s testimony at trial. With
two previous drug offences in his record, no alibi, and only his word
against that of a police officer, Moore’s defense lawyer was correct to
53
tell him that he had no chance at trial. Following his refusal to plea
bargain, Moore was convicted after a trial that lasted less than a day
54
and was sentenced to ninety-nine years of imprisonment.

47. See Texas “Officer of the Year” Chalked Up 38 Wrongful Convictions, CTR. ON
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, NW. L., http://www.law.northwestern.edu/cwc/exonerations/
txtuliasummary.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (explaining that the reinvestigation of the case
was the result of efforts by a Texas Observer reporter whose stories were brought to the
attention of an NAACP lawyer, who then assembled a legal team to represent the imprisoned
Tulia defendants, which ultimately resulted in the defendants’ exoneration). Many of the details
of the Tulia scandal are taken from NATE BLAKESLEE, TULIA: RACE, COCAINE, AND
CORRUPTION IN A SMALL TEXAS TOWN (2005).
48. Texas “Officer of the Year” Chalked Up 38 Wrongful Convictions, supra note 47.
49. BLAKESLEE, supra note 47, at 408.
50. See id. at 77 (reporting that the results of the first trial “spread quickly among the small
pool of lawyers who handled indigent defendants’ cases in Swisher County”).
51. See id. at 43–157 (describing the pleas and sentences of the first eight Tulia defendants).
For a summary of the Tulia cases, see Texas “Officer of the Year” Chalked Up 38 Wrongful
Convictions, supra note 47.
52. BLAKESLEE, supra note 47, at 48.
53. Id. at 44–48.
54. Id. at 57–59. Moore was frustrated by his lawyer’s lack of trust and asked to dismiss
him, but the court rejected this request as well as another request for a continuance to examine
the officer’s credibility. Id. at 48. Even after Moore’s requests were rejected, however, he still
refused to accept plea offers. Id.
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Similarly, Fred Brookins knew that all five defendants whose
trials preceded his own had been convicted based on similar
55
testimony by the same officer who was about to testify against him.
Brookins nevertheless rejected a deal for five years of imprisonment
on the eve of the trial, against his lawyer’s strong advice, arguing that
he should not plead guilty to something that he had not done.
Following his plea refusal, he received a twenty-year sentence at
56
trial.
The eight Tulia defendants’ consistent and independent refusals
to plea bargain not only demonstrate the reluctance of some
innocents to plea, but also suggest that such reluctance may be quite
common, even in cases such as these—that is, with defendants facing
strong incriminating evidence, high trial risk, and the contrary advice
of their defense lawyers. In a state where only 0.5 percent of
defendants in drug-related offenses opted for a jury trial in 1999,
these eight defendants made the exceptional decision to reject a plea
57
offer and face a jury. It is particularly striking that the latter of the
first eight innocents refused to plea bargain despite seeing how
virtually identical testimony led to extremely harsh prison sentences
for those who preceded them, in the same courtroom, and with the
58
same two judges.
The Tulia cases also illustrate that innocents’ reluctance to plea
bargain is not without limit. Following the harsh sentences that were
imposed on the first eight defendants, only three of the remaining
defendants went to trial; the other twenty-seven innocents pled guilty,
many of them in return for very attractive nonincarceration
59
sentences. Thus, at least when the plea concession is great and the
55. Id. at 148.
56. Id. at 157.
57. In Texas in 1999, only 74 of the 24,570 convictions (0.3 percent) in drug offenses in
county courts took place in front of a jury. Another 105 convictions (0.4 percent) resulted from
nonjury trial, and the remaining 99.2 percent of these convictions followed guilty pleas. 147
defendants were acquitted. 81 in non-jury trials and only 51 in jury trials, with an additional 15
receiving a directed verdict or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Therefore, 125 of 24,837
defendants overall (0.5 percent) opted for a trial by jury. 1999 Annual Report, Statewide
Summary of Reported Activity: Criminal, Probate, and Mental Health, TEX. COURT ONLINE,
http://www.courts.state.tx.us/pubs/AR99/county/cosum99.xlw (last visited Sept. 22, 2012)
(recording statewide criminal-justice activity for the year ending August 31, 1999).
58. See BLAKESLEE, supra note 47, at 77–157 (describing the pleas and sentences of the
first eight Tulia defendants).
59. Lee Hockstader, Texas To Toss Drug Convictions Against 38 People, Prosecutor
Concedes “Travesty of Justice,” WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2003, at A03; see also BLAKESLEE, supra
note 47, at 160–61 (summarizing the pleas of the Tulia defendants).
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extremely high likelihood of conviction at trial is undeniable, even
innocents commonly will plea bargain. Notably, however, the overall
trial rate of the Tulia innocents was still 29 percent, with eleven of
thirty-eight defendants refusing to plea bargain, a dramatically higher
rate than the 0.5 percent rate for comparable offenses in Texas noted
60
in the previous paragraph.
The Tulia dataset reveals a strong innocence effect for offenses
that, although less severe than those murder and rape cases in our
larger exoneration database, still carry extended incarceration
sentences. The evidence also indicates that the first eight defendants’
refusal to plea bargain was significantly motivated by fairness
61
concerns. Furthermore, the Tulia cases show the innocence effect
among defendants who did not initiate the efforts that led to their
62
later exoneration.
Taken together, our varied sources of field data paint a picture in
which considerations of culpability matter to criminal defendants, and
in which innocents in particular are reluctant to accept plea offers
except in some limited circumstances—namely, when innocents
recognize that conviction is very likely, when the plea concession is
great, when they believe that they are facing the risk of death
sentence, or when they had falsely confessed during investigation.
63
Although the shadow-of-trial model predicts otherwise, defendants’
culpability shapes their behavior not only indirectly by influencing
their probability of conviction and expected sentence, but also
directly by impacting their willingness to accept plea offers.
Nevertheless, both our general exoneration evidence and the
Tulia dataset concern only serious offenses—ones with long
incarceration sentences that leave sufficient time for an exoneration
to occur. These offenses may not represent the behavior of criminal
defendants in less serious cases in which exoneration evidence is
unavailable. To provide further support for the prevalence of the
innocence effect and evidence of its generality, we turn to two early
experimental studies that examined plea-bargaining behavior through
controlled experiments.

60.
61.
62.
63.

See supra note 57.
See supra text accompanying notes 54–56.
See supra note 47.
See supra note 6.

GAZAY-AYAL & TOR IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE INNOCENCE EFFECT

10/19/2012 2:02 PM

359

D. Experimental Evidence
After offering in the preceding sections both quantitative and
anecdotal evidence from the field for the innocence effect, we now
consider two early experimental studies of plea behavior. Such studies
are particularly suited to offer direct evidence for a causal
64
relationship between innocence and the reluctance to plea. By
allowing researchers to manipulate participants’ culpability and
examine its effects on the willingness to plea bargain, these
experiments provide evidence that the data from the field—where
culpability is predetermined—cannot provide. Although field
evidence may show a dramatic, negative correlation between
innocence and the willingness to plea, experimental tests can help to
reveal whether innocence is an actual cause of this effect.
Experimental tests permit researchers to manipulate a particular
variable—such as culpability—and examine its effects in a controlled
65
environment. Despite their unique benefits, however, controlled
experiments, particularly when conducted in laboratory settings, also
have some inherent limitations, most notably with respect to their
66
external validity. Findings in laboratory settings may not generalize
well to the real world when the experiment fails to replicate
important elements of the question that the researcher aims to study.
This failure can happen, for example, due to the artificial nature of
many laboratory studies or because the experimental participants
somehow differ systematically from the real-world individuals in
67
whose behavior we are interested.
This concern about external validity seems particularly acute in
the case of plea bargaining. For instance, the extreme consequences
of criminal defendants’ decisions cannot fully be replicated in the
laboratory. Moreover, there are serious ethical and practical
problems involved in misleading experimental participants to believe
that they are guilty of committing a criminal offense. And there is the
possibility that criminal defendants are somehow different from the
64. See Tor, supra note 17, at 281–90 (discussing the virtues of empirical studies).
65. Id.
66. See ROBERT ROSENTHAL & RALPH L. ROSNOW, ESSENTIALS OF BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH: METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS 212 (3d ed. 2008) (explaining that external
validity refers to whether the results of an experiment generalize to the public at large);
WILLIAM R. SHADISH, THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, EXPERIMENTAL AND
QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL DESIGNS FOR GENERALIZED CAUSAL INFERENCE 38 (2002) (defining
validity and threats to validity).
67. ROSENTHAL & ROSNOW, supra note 66, at 212; Tor, supra note 17, at 287.
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general population from which studies draw their experimental
68
participants.
A more careful analysis suggests, however, that the limitations of
experimental tests of plea-bargaining behavior are less detrimental
than they initially appear to be. First and importantly, we draw on the
experimental findings described below to gain further insight into the
innocence effect—of which we already have substantial real-world
evidence—not to establish its very existence. In fact, the evidence of
the effect in these experiments serves more to highlight the studies’
external validity—that is, that they replicate real plea bargaining
behavior at least in this important respect—than to further
corroborate our real-world evidence.
Second, some experimental tests included elements showing that,
specifically in the plea-bargaining setting, the results of hypothetical
questionnaires bear close resemblance to those results obtained by
69
realistic simulations.
Additionally, the responses of college
students—the most common participants in laboratory experiments—
to such questionnaires are largely similar to those of convicted
70
criminals.
In two early experiments, Professor Gregory and his coauthors
found that innocence affected participants’ willingness to accept plea
71
offers. One study concerned a lighter criminal offense—armed
robbery—than the ones appearing in our field data; the other study
involved a non-criminal, academic infraction. Moreover, Gregory et
al. not only employed a simulation (for the robbery scenario) but also
studied the behavior of individuals who were misled to believe that
they had committed an academic infraction.
The first study asked male students to imagine that they were
72
either innocent or guilty of having committed armed robbery. The
students received highly detailed information on the circumstances
68. See Avishalom Tor, Oren Gazal-Ayal & Stephen M. Garcia, Fairness and the
Willingness To Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 103 (2010)
(discussing these problems).
69. See generally Gregory et al., supra note 13 (describing consistent results between a
study that used a hypothetical questionnaire and one that used a realistic simulation).
70. See Pauline Houlden, The Impact of Procedural Modifications on Evaluations of Plea
Bargaining, 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 267, 279 (finding roughly similar outcomes in the responses
of student participants and inmate participants in a study of defendants’ preferences about
procedural aspects of plea barganing).
71. See Gregory et al., supra note 13, 1525 (“The present data suggest that the innocence or
guilt of a defendant is a very strong determinant of acceptance of a plea bargain.”).
72. Id. at 1522–23.
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that led to their imagined arrest for committing the crime, the charges
against them, their punishment if convicted, and the details of a plea
bargain that they were offered. Although the plea offers were
identical for all participants, the first three variables—culpability,
number of charges, and prison sentence if convicted—were
73
manipulated between subjects. This design ensured that the
participants, who were randomly assigned to their respective
experimental conditions, were not exposed to multiple versions of the
simulation and thus could not know that the experimenters were
studying, inter alia, the role of innocence (as opposed to any other
variable) in plea bargaining. The results of this first study showed that
innocent participants were significantly more likely than guilty ones
74
to reject the plea offer.
In the second experiment, in which students were accused of
having prior information about answers to a difficult test, the
researchers employed a confederate to place students in their
75
respective conditions of actual guilt or innocence. This realistic
experiment corroborated the results of the hypothetical decisions
made by participants in the simulation study and found that innocent
participants were dramatically less likely than guilty participants to
accept a plea-like compromise offer in lieu of facing judgment with
76
higher potential penalties by an ethics committee. This pattern of
behavior prevailed, although both the charges and the evidence
77
against the two participant groups were identical.
The results of Gregory et al.’s two controlled experiments
complement our field evidence. They indicate that in the pleabargaining domain hypothetical studies using students as participants
and requiring “as if” behavior can possess external validity. In
addition, these studies—as well as the multiple additional
experiments we discuss in Part II.C—suggest that the innocence effect

73. Id. For a discussion of the differences between “within-subjects” and “betweensubjects” experimental designs, see ROSENTHAL & ROSNOW, supra note 66, at 170–192.
74. Gregory et al., supra note 13, at 1525. Interestingly, the study also found main effects
for the other independent variables (for example, the number of charges and the severity of
punishment) and an interaction between them. Id. These effects, however, appeared when
analyzing guilty but not innocent participants, id., which further corroborates the dominance of
fairness considerations in innocents’ decisions.
75. Id. at 1526.
76. Id. at 1528.
77. Id. The evidence against the participants consisted only of their alleged high grade on
what was represented to be a very difficult examination. Id.
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extends to lighter offenses and infractions beyond those severe
offenses appearing in our field evidence.
II. CAUSES
A diverse set of empirical findings reveals a pattern in which
considerations of culpability appear to be paramount in defendants’
plea behavior generally, and in which innocents specifically exhibit a
78
strong tendency to refuse plea offers. Yet explanations other than a
genuine reluctance to plea may account for innocent defendants’
behavior. Innocents, for instance, may exhibit more frequent plea
refusals simply because they face better acquittal prospects at trial
compared to guilty defendants.
Moreover, even if the innocence effect truly is driven by
innocence per se instead of the various other factors that typically are
associated with innocence, such as innocents’ often-superior trial
prospects, the field evidence sheds only limited light on the precise
mechanisms whereby innocence facilitates plea rejections. Innocents
may refuse to plead guilty because of a preference for justice or
fairness. These defendants may also spurn plea offers more often than
guilty defendants due to innocents’ more optimistic predictions of
79
80
their trial prospects, or for other reasons altogether.
As Part III explains, however, a better understanding of the
mechanisms underlying the innocence effect is important for pleabargaining policy. To this end, Part II.A first considers alternative
accounts besides actual innocence for the innocence effect,
concluding that these accounts cannot fully explain the empirical
data. Part II.B then turns to the likely mechanisms underlying the
effect, drawing on a rich psychological literature that studied similar
78. See supra Part I.
79. See infra Part II.B.3.
80. Cf. Colin Camerer & Eric Talley, Experimental Study of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS 1619, 1621 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“[E]mpirical
approaches suffer from the fact that it is often difficult to stage (much less to observe by
happenstance) a truly natural experiment in the real world that implies clear causal conclusions.
Because laboratory approaches excel in just this respect, at the very least good experimental
designs are likely to provide a complementary and confirmatory check on empirical methods.”).
Professor Russell Korobkin has noted the limits of empirical evidence in illuminating legallyrelevant questions: “Potentially even more troubling, however, is that the data required for such
studies is often impossible (or virtually impossible) to obtain and, even when it can be obtained,
the results themselves or the implications to be drawn from the results will often be contestable
and ultimately indeterminate.” Russell Korobkin, Possibility and Plausibility in Law and
Economics, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 786 (2005).
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behavior outside the plea-bargaining context. Finally, Part II.C
reports the results of multiple experimental tests of plea bargaining
that bring the psychological underpinnings of the innocence effect
into sharper relief and provide a firmer foundation for the positive
and normative analyses we undertake in Part III.
A. Alternative Accounts
Two alternative accounts would attribute the innocence effect to
the nature of the cases facing innocent defendants rather than to
innocence itself. According to the first account, innocents refuse the
bargain more often because, on average, they face weaker
prosecution cases and thus a better chance of acquittal at trial.
Because both parties know that the case is weak, the defendant is
unwilling to plead guilty.
Despite its intuitive appeal, however, this argument fails to
consider the impact of prosecutorial discretion and incentives on plea
bargaining. As long as prosecutors know the strength of their cases
and are willing and able to adjust their plea offers based on the
probability of conviction at trial using charge, fact, or sentence
81
bargaining, the rate at which defendants accept plea offers should
82
remain the same in weaker and stronger cases. In fact, we already
noted that prosecutors are expected to make more—rather than
less—attractive plea offers in weaker cases that they still decide to
83
prosecute in an effort to avoid the risk of failure to convict at trial.
In strong cases, prosecutors worry less about the possibility of trial
because they are confident that they will secure a conviction. By
contrast, in weak cases they will do much more to secure a guilty plea
because an acquittal at trial is more likely. In fact, the behavior of the
84
Tulia defendants, who knew that the cases against them were strong,
and the results of the experimental studies that controlled for the
81. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
82. Cf. Alschuler, supra note 3, at 58–60 (describing the administrative and tactical
pressures that lead prosecutors to scale offers to the strength of their case); Champion, supra
note 8, at 257 (showing that prosecutors have “an overwhelming propensity” to moderate the
terms of the deal in weak cases).
83. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Alschuler, supra note 3, at 106–07
(noting that prosecutors are often measured by their rate of convictions and thus care much
more about conviction than sentencing); Bibas, supra note 3, at 2472 (“Losses at trial hurt
prosecutors’ public images, so prosecutors have incentives to take to trial only extremely strong
cases and to bargain away weak ones.”); Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2318 (explaining why
prosecutors do their utmost to cut deals in weak cases, as the risk of acquittal is relatively high).
84. See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text.
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probability of conviction further demonstrate that the innocence
effect cannot be attributed to the possible weakness of the cases
against innocent defendants.
Under the second account, one might argue that the low rate of
plea bargains is a result of innocent defendants’ rational evaluation of
their trial prospects. After all, trials are designed to reveal the truth.
Under this view, innocent defendants will rationally estimate that
their chances are better than those of guilty defendants. However,
prosecutors, who bring charges only against suspects that they believe
to be guilty, do not know which defendants in fact are innocent.
Therefore, they cannot take innocence into account when adjusting
the plea offer to the evidence of defendants’ culpability that they
otherwise possess. This information asymmetry hinders the
negotiation between prosecutors and innocents and diminishes the
86
likelihood of successful plea bargaining with these defendants.
Notwithstanding the likely contribution of information
asymmetry to the innocence effect, however, its significance should
not be overstated. Trials, like plea bargaining, are shaped by the
available evidence. As Professor Stephen Schulhofer explained,
“[i]nnocence by itself (that is, apart from its link to particular
87
evidence) can have only a small impact on the odds of conviction.”
On the other hand, innocents who possess evidence that will assist
88
them at trial typically can use it during plea bargaining as well.
Therefore, besides those uncommon cases in which innocent
defendants might prefer to conceal admissible, acquitting evidence to
surprise the prosecution at trial, rational innocents would much rather
use that evidence earlier to convince the prosecutor to dismiss the
case or at least to offer a more attractive plea bargain.
We are hard pressed to believe, for instance, that nearly all of the
defendants in the exoneration database refused to plead guilty simply
because they correctly estimated that their chances of acquittal at trial
were high—due to private information that they could not
convincingly convey to prosecutors—yet ultimately were all
wrongfully convicted. We do know, moreover, that the Tulia
85. See infra notes 156–172 and accompanying text.
86. See Grossman & Katz, supra note 5, at 753–55 (explaining that the utility of plea
bargaining will be limited when prosecutors cannot distinguish guilty from innocent
defendants); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1940–46 (describing in detail the effects of
imperfect information on plea-bargaining strategy).
87. Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1984.
88. Id. at 1984 & n.21.
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defendants did not possess any private information when they refused
89
to plea. Similarly, those innocent experimental participants in
90
Gregory et al.’s studies, as well as the participants who refused to
plea bargain in the additional experimental tests reported in Part II.C,
had no private information.
Furthermore, prosecutors are well aware that their plea offers
must include a substantial discount to attract defendants with a broad
91
range of risk attitudes and estimates of trial prospects. In fact,
prosecutors’ offers must be attractive not only to the average
defendant but to nearly all defendants. Consequently, a small
difference in the parties’ trial predictions—whether based on private
information or any other factor—is unlikely to prevent prosecutors
92
and defendants from reaching an agreement.
B. Psychological Insights
We found that innocent defendants are less willing to plea
bargain than guilty defendants are, even under similar charges and
evidence, and that the nature of the cases that innocents face provides
an insufficient account for their plea reluctance. To gain a better
understanding of the mechanisms that generate innocents’ plea
rejections, we turn to the rich psychological literature that studies
similar behaviors outside the plea-bargaining context. Specifically, we
focus on two important elements that defendants take into account
according to the shadow-of-trial model when deciding whether to
plea bargain: their beliefs regarding the expected sanction at trial and
their risk preferences.
1. Beliefs and Preferences in the Shadow of Trial. Defendants’
beliefs play a central role in shadow-of-trial models: defendants must
compare the certain sanction offered by the plea to the probabilistic
89. See supra Part I.C.
90. See supra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
91. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 714–15 (“[P]rosecutors are not content merely to vector
the risks of litigation. . . . [T]hey tailor their offers not to balance but to overbalance a
defendant’s chances of acquittal.”).
92. One might argue that prosecutors can offer minimal discounts to all defendants and
then offer better deals to those who reject their initial offers. This practice would allow
prosecutors to distinguish among defendants who hold different risk attitudes and different
estimates of trial outcomes. Because defense attorneys are repeat players, however, prosecutors
could not employ such a strategy without losing their ability to threaten defendants with a
credible final offer. To establish credibility, prosecutors must offer similar deals to similarly
situated defendants and then try those defendants who reject the offers.
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sanction at trial, which will be meted out only if they are convicted. In
the simplest case, prosecutors and defendants possess the same
evidence and make identical, objective, and rational predictions of
likely trial outcomes based on this common information. More
complex models may account for cases in which defendants’ private
information leads them to form different beliefs about the likely
93
outcomes of trial from those held by prosecutors.
Shadow-of-trial models—like traditional law-and-economics
94
models more generally—assume that the parties are strictly rational.
At most, given the incomplete information available at the pleabargaining stage, prosecutors and defendants will make occasional
mistakes, thereby overestimating or underestimating the expected
sanction at trial. When both parties share such mistakes, the
95
likelihood of plea bargaining is unaffected. And even when the
occasional erroneous judgment creates a gap between the parties’
beliefs—such as when a defendant underestimates or a prosecutor
overestimates the expected sanction at trial—they are still likely to
reach agreement because prosecutors’ generous offers already take
96
into account the possibility of judgment errors by either party.
Because shadow-of-trial models envision the defendant as
rationally balancing certain versus probable sanctions, defendants’
97
risk preferences are a decisive consideration in any such model. That
is, different defendants exhibit different propensities to accept
identical plea offers when faced with the same expected sanctions at

93. See Grossman & Katz, supra note 5, at 753–55 (describing a model in which defendants’
decisions are impacted by their knowledge of their guilt or innocence).
94. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3 (8th ed. 2011) (“The task
of economics . . . is to explore the implications of assuming that man is a rational maximizer of
his ends in life . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 1–2 (2004) (discussing the role of the rationality assumption in descriptive
analysis and noting that “the view taken will generally be that actors are ‘rational,’” “forwardlooking and behav[ing] so as to maximize their expected utility”); see also Russell B. Korobkin
& Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from
Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1053, 1060–66 (2000) (reviewing various formulations of
rational action within legal scholarship).
95. Cf. Landes, supra note 5, at 67 (“If both parties agree on the probability of conviction
by trial, a settlement will take place for defendants who are risk averse or risk neutral . . . .”).
96. See id. at 68 & n.14 (showing that even defendants who are optimistic about their
chances of acquittal at trial might still accept a plea offer); see also supra note 91 and
accompanying text.
97. Professor Landes already incorporated defendants’ risk aversion into his seminal
model. Landes, supra note 5, at 61–63. Professors Gene Grossman and Michael Katz discussed
the influence of society’s attitude to risk as well. Grossman & Katz, supra note 5, at 750–52.
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trial. Risk-neutral defendants simply maximize the expected value of
their choices, accepting all bargains that offer a sanction lower than
98
the expected sanction at trial and rejecting all other offers. More
advanced models, however, account for criminal defendants who are
risk-averse—as individuals are thought to be with respect to
99
significant decisions more generally. Risk-averse defendants, by
definition, find the negative outcome of conviction at trial to be of
greater concern than the probability of conviction alone would
indicate. Not only will such defendants accept plea offers that equal
the expected sanction at trial, they will accept offers that are higher
than the expected sanction, all to avoid the risk of an even higher
sanction in case of their conviction at trial.
In a similar vein, risk-seeking defendants reject even offers that
equal the expected sanction at trial. Such defendants are less
concerned about conviction and sanction at trial and therefore
demand that the plea offer discount the sanction beyond its expected
value before accepting it. Notably, traditional shadow-of-trial models

98. Note that, in reality, risk-neutral, and even risk-averse, defendants may reject offers
that equal the expected value at trial because of a diminishing marginal sensitivity to
incarceration. Although incarceration is always undesirable, a doubly long period of
incarceration, for instance, may be less than doubly undesirable. In this case, risk-averse
defendants with a 50 percent chance of a four-year incarceration may still reject a plea bargain
that is set at the expected value of a two-year incarceration. See William Spelman, The Severity
of Intermediate Sanctions, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 107, 113 (1995) (summarizing empirical
studies that found that defendants who were interviewed shortly after being arrested regarded a
five-year prison sentence to be only twice as severe as a one-year sentence, and a ten-year
sentence to be about four to five times more severe than a one-year sentence). Moreover, the
findings of research on intertemporal choice—such as that facing defendants in the shadow of
trial—reveal that people tend to be hyperbolic discounters, giving disproportional weight to
short-term outcomes over long-term ones. See George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic
Discounting, in CHOICE OVER TIME, 57 (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 1992)
(explaining the phenomenon of hyperbolic discounting). But risk-averse defendants who are
hyperbolic discounters will have further cause to reject offers that are set at the expected value
of trial because future incarceration matters to them far less than near-term incarceration
following the plea. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1538–41 (1998) (arguing that “years
in prison far in the future will be discounted very heavily” against more short-term
consequences); see also Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2338 (arguing that “future [prison time] is
heavily discounted by defendants”). Yet insofar as diminishing marginal sensitivity and
hyperbolic discounting exert similar pressure on guilty and innocent defendants, these processes
do not alter the present analysis, which focuses on the differences between the two types of
defendants.
99. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 44–46 (6th ed.
2012) (noting that, in decisions involving monetary outcomes, economists assume that decision
makers are risk-averse or, at times, risk-neutral); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 52–53 (2d ed. 1989) (same).
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100

pay little attention to the case of risk-seeking defendants, as this risk
101
attitude usually is considered irrational.
Moreover, even
behaviorally informed research suggesting that criminal defendants
may be more risk seeking than other individuals does not consider the
possibility of a systematic divergence in risk attitudes between
102
innocent and guilty defendants.
In sum, although defendants’ beliefs and preferences are central
to shadow-of-trial models, these models account for neither the
possibility of the occasional erroneous belief nor the prospect of riskseeking defendants exerting an appreciable effect on overall pleabargaining rates. Even more importantly, however, the extant
literature’s failure to identify the innocence effect means that shadowof-trial models do not consider the fact that innocent and guilty
defendants exhibit systematically different beliefs and preferences in
103
comparable settings.
Yet the extensive psychological literature on human judgment
and decision making reveals a number of processes that might
underlie the innocence effect identified by our empirical evidence.
These processes can lead innocents to hold, first, systematically more
optimistic beliefs than guilty defendants, which make trial prospects
seem more attractive to the former than they appear to the latter;
and, second, more risk-seeking preferences that diminish for
innocents the attractiveness of the standard plea offers made by
prosecutors to all similarly situated defendants.

100. See, e.g., Landes, supra note 5, at 67–68; Grossman & Katz, supra note 5, at 755–56
(discussing the effects of varying degrees of risk aversion without addressing risk seeking).
101. Cf. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 99, at 45 (“[M]ost people are averse toward risk, but
some people . . . like gamblers, rock climbers, and race car drivers, prefer risk.”); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113, 122 (1996)
(“Although the economic models of suit and settlement allow for the possibility that parties
make risk-seeking choices, this possibility is not taken seriously.”).
102. See Birke, supra note 16, at 208–10 (discussing “four hypotheses that attempt to
reconcile the rate of guilty pleas and the principle of loss aversion” and making no distinction
between innocent and guilty defendants). One exception is Professor Bibas, who reaches a
conclusion opposite to our empirical findings by speculating that innocent defendants might be
less susceptible to loss aversion because “[m]ost criminals are less risk averse (at least with
regard to imprisonment) than law-abiding citizens.” Bibas, supra note 3, at 2509–10.
103. Intriguingly, one of the foundational papers in the shadow-of-trial literature on plea
bargaining briefly mentions this possibility without examining it further. See Landes, supra note
5, at 69 (“[A]n innocent person may have an aversion to lying so that he would have a greater
reluctance to plead guilty to an offense than a guilty person. This can be interpreted as imposing
psychic losses on a guilty plea for an innocent suspect which would . . . increase the likelihood of
a trial.”).
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2. Diverging Beliefs. The empirical psychological literature
reveals a number of phenomena that are likely to impact innocent
and guilty defendants differently. In this Section, we briefly explore
the potential contribution of the illusion of transparency, the belief in
104
a just world, and the availability heuristic.
The illusion of transparency refers to people’s common tendency
to overestimate the degree to which others can discern their internal
105
states—whether thoughts, feelings, or sensations. In a series of
studies, for example, researchers showed that experimental
participants who are induced to lie overestimate the detectability of
106
their lies. Participants in one study played a multiple-round, roundrobin game in which they told either lies (in one round) or the truth
(in all other rounds) and observed the statements of other
107
participants. As predicted, participants overestimated the degree to
108
which others could detect whether they were telling the truth.
Later studies showed that the illusion of transparency appears in
negotiation settings as well. Even experienced negotiators
overestimated the degree to which their negotiation partners were
able to discern information that they tried to convey about their
109
preferences. Importantly for our purposes, one study showed that
this psychological phenomenon varies with the degree of power that

104. Another important judgment process that may affect innocent and guilty defendants
differently is the biasing effect that preferences exert on beliefs, which we discuss infra notes
123–152 and accompanying text. Notably, most of the processes that lead individuals to
overoptimistic predictions of their future prospects are expected to impact criminal defendants
generally without systematically distinguishing the innocent from the guilty. See Tor, supra note
17, at 245–72 (providing a brief review of these processes).
105. Thomas Gilovich, Victoria Husted Medvec & Kenneth Savitsky, The Illusion of
Transparency: Biased Assessments of Others’ Ability To Read Our Emotional States, 75 J.
PERSON. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 332, 332–33 (1998) (noting that the illusion of transparency is one
manifestation of egocentrically biased perspective taking, in which individuals estimate the
perspective of others using their own phenomenological experience as a starting point and
insufficiently adjust from it); see also John R. Chambers, Nicholas Epley, Kenneth Savitsky &
Paul D. Windschitl, Knowing Too Much: Using Private Knowledge To Predict How One Is
Viewed by Others, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 542, 542 (2008) (showing that the difficulty people have in
intuiting how they are viewed by others is caused by their active reliance on private information
that others do not have access to).
106. Gilovich, supra note 105, at 332.
107. Id. at 334–35.
108. Id. Follow-up studies further showed that participants’ overestimation of others’ ability
to detect their lies stemmed from the illusion of transparency rather than from competing
psychological accounts, such as a belief in the general detectability of lies. Id. at 335–36.
109. Leaf Van Boven, Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, The Illusion of
Transparency in Negotiations, 2003 NEG. J. 117, 124 (2003).
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negotiators possess. Less powerful negotiators—who in this study
were given the role of an employee—exhibited a stronger illusion of
transparency than did more powerful negotiators—who were
110
assigned the role of a manager. These findings suggest that the
pervasive illusion may be stronger among defendants, who are in an
exceptionally weak position in the face of criminal charges.
In fact, two separate studies that examined the behavior of mock
criminal suspects at the investigation stage found the illusion of
transparency to be at work. In the first study, innocent participants
were significantly more likely than their guilty counterparts to waive
111
their Miranda rights. The difference between the innocent and the
guilty was caused by the naive belief that is held by most innocent
112
defendants in the power of their innocence to set them free. In the
second study, which examined suspects’ strategies during police
interrogations, guilty suspects employed a variety of strategies to
appear truthful, but innocents sought to tell the truth as it happened,
113
reflecting a belief in the visibility of their innocence.
Defendants operating under the illusion of transparency will
overestimate a court’s ability to determine whether they are telling
the truth. These defendants will adjust their trial predictions to their
subjective knowledge regarding their culpability well beyond what the
objective evidence against them would dictate. In such cases, we
should find a systematic divergence between the trial predictions of
innocents, who will overestimate their probability of acquittal, and of
guilty defendants, who will underestimate it.
The common belief in a just world—people’s tendency to view
114
the world as a just place where individuals get what they deserve —is
another factor that may contribute to the systematic discrepancy

110. Stephen M. Garcia, Power and the Illusion of Transparency in Negotiation, 17 J. BUS. &
PSYCHOL. 133, 142–43 (2002).
111. Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: The
Power of Innocence, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 211, 217 (2004).
112. Id. at 218.
113. Maria Hartwig, Pär Anders Granhag & Leif A. Strömwall, Guilty and Innocent
Suspects’ Strategies During Police Interrogations, 13 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 213, 224–25 (2007).
114. An early formulation of the theory can be found in Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller,
Just World Research and the Attribution Process: Looking Back and Ahead, 85 PSYCHOL. BULL.
1030 (1978). For more recent reviews of this phenomenon, its scope, and its limitations, see
generally Adrian Furnham, Belief in a Just World: Research Progress over the Past Decade, 34
PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 795 (2003); Carolyn L. Hafer & Laurent Bègue,
Experimental Research on Just-World Theory: Problems, Developments, and Future Challenges,
131 PSYCHOL. BULL. 128 (2005).
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between innocent and guilty defendants’ beliefs. According to
research on this phenomenon, people’s need to believe in a just world
115
is manifested in their responses to observed justice and injustice.
Because of the belief in a just world, for instance, the guilty
excessively may fear the discovery of further evidence that would
ensure their conviction, whereas the innocent may unduly believe that
their lawyers will gather evidence or witnesses that will prove their
innocence. When present, such beliefs could lead guilty defendants to
underestimate their trial prospects, but these beliefs could also
116
encourage the innocent mistakenly to overestimate them.
The differential effects of the illusion of transparency and the
belief in a just world on innocent and guilty defendants are likely to
117
be reinforced by the pervasive availability heuristic. This heuristic is
often used in assessments of the probability of events. Judgments that
rely on the availability heuristic exploit people’s better and faster
recall of more—as opposed to less—common instances or events and
on their finding it easier to imagine likely occurrences than unlikely
118
ones. When judging by availability, people substitute the ease of
mental retrieval or construction for a direct estimation of the actual
119
numerosity of a class or the likelihood of an event.
Availability-based judgments are useful because they are rapid,
effortless, and typically quite accurate. But they also generate
predictable errors. Some variables impact availability but not
115. E.g., Hafer & Bègue, supra note 114, at 128.
116. Cf. Gregory et al., supra note 13, at 1526 (suggesting that the belief in a just world may
lead innocents erroneously to think that their refusal to plea bargain will serve as evidence of
their innocence). One might speculate, however, that just-world beliefs exert a greater effect on
guilty defendants than on those innocents who have already suffered through the various stages
of the criminal-justice process up to this point.
117. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 4 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973) (explaining the availability
heuristic). For a brief summary and some legal applications, see Tor, supra note 17, at 248–49.
118. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 117, at 208.
119. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11–14 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 9th prtg. 1988); see also Norbert Schwarz & Leigh
Ann Vaughn, The Availability Heuristic Revisited: Ease of Recall and Content of Recall as
Distinct Sources of Information, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE
JUDGMENT 103, 117–18 (Thomas Gilovich, Dave Griffin & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002)
(disentangling two potential mechanisms underlying the availability heuristic and concluding
that the ease of recall is the mechanism of more general relevance); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra, at 163, 163–78 (exploring different
types of judgments by availability).
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probability and frequency; others affect probability and frequency but
120
not availability. For example, factors that make instances easier to
retrieve or imagine without changing their true probability lead to a
121
To
systematic overestimation in availability-driven judgments.
illustrate, although people generally hold reasonable estimates of the
relative lethality of various potential causes of death, they
systematically misestimate the frequency of causes of death that tend
to be under- or over-publicized, so that the risk of homicide is
dramatically overestimated, but the risk of death by stroke is
122
underestimated.
Due to availability effects in recall and construction, guilty
defendants—who better recall incriminating evidence—will tend to
overestimate their trial risk and find it easier to imagine how this
evidence could lead to their conviction in court. Innocents, on the
other hand, will tend to exhibit the opposite tendencies,
underestimating their likelihood of conviction at trial.
3. Diverging Preferences. An extensive empirical literature
documents how considerations of fairness impact individuals’
123
preferences and decisions. The wrongful conviction of the innocent
124
is commonly perceived as an unjust or unfair outcome, whereas
convicting the guilty is not only just or fair but a main function of the
criminal-justice system. It is plausible, therefore, that innocents view
their wrongful conviction following a plea bargain as unjust or unfair.
Guilty defendants, on the other hand, may not share that view of the
bargain even if they find the prospect of conviction to be
125
undesirable. Therefore, fairness considerations can lead innocents,
120. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 117, at 209.
121. Id.; see also John S. Carroll, The Effect of Imagining an Event on Expectations for the
Event: An Interpretation in Terms of the Availability Heuristic, 14 J. EXPERIM. SOC. PSYCHOL.
88, 94 (1978) (finding that participants who imagined events made higher-probability estimates
of these events than did other participants who did not imagine them).
122. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff & Sarah Lichtenstein, Facts Versus Fears:
Understanding Perceived Risk, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES,
supra note 119, at 463, 465–72.
123. Importantly, the processes that we describe here, which generate the diverging risk
attitudes of the innocent and the guilty, exert their effect in addition to those universal riskseeking tendencies that are explored in other behaviorally informed scholarship. See supra note
16 and accompanying text.
124. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 72 (1985) (“People have a profound
right not to be convicted of crimes of which they are innocent.”).
125. Of course, guilty defendants may still find the sanction offered in the plea bargain to be
excessive in light of the offense, the expected sanction at trial, or in comparison to other plea
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in a number of distinct ways, to exhibit greater risk-seeking in their
plea behavior than guilty defendants.
First, studies demonstrate that people care about receiving fair
treatment in bargaining, engage in costly retaliation against unfair
treatment, and react negatively to such treatment even when
126
retaliation is impossible. One illustrative and extensively studied
case of such fairness-oriented behavior is the ultimatum game, in
which one player (Proposer) is asked to allocate a given sum of
money to himself and another player (Responder), and the latter
127
must choose whether to accept the offered allocation. If Responder
accepts, each party gets a share according to the offer; if Responder
128
rejects the offer, both parties get nothing. The basic game is
anonymous and without repetition, thus strategic considerations, such
129
as developing a certain reputation, logically are irrelevant.
A rational Responder should accept any positive sum of money
because the alternative to acceptance is rejection without any
payment. In reality, however, Responders tend to reject offers that
are below 20 to 30 percent of the sum that stands for allocation, and
Proposers usually offer an even greater proportion of 40 to 50 percent
130
of the sum. These findings hold true when the game is conducted
131
with significant sums of money. Responders’ behavior reveals

offers in similar cases. See Tor et al., supra note 68, at 107–09 (providing empirical evidence that
comparative evaluations of a plea bargain affect a defendant’s willingness to accept a plea
offer).
126. See, e.g., Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff & Colin Camerer,
Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995) (offering
experimental evidence for fairness-driven biases in negotiation by parties to a hypothetical tort
case); George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock, Self-Serving
Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993) (same); Matthew
Rabin, Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281,
1283–84 (1993) (explaining the importance of fairness considerations for understanding
behavior).
127. See Werner Güth, Rolf Schmittberger & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental Analysis of
Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367, 370 (1982) (providing an early report of
the ultimatum game); Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253, 258 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995)
(summarizing findings of ultimatum-game experiments). The ultimatum-game literature is very
large. One readable, high-quality summary is available in COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL
GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION 48–55 (2003).
128. CAMERER, supra note 127, at 8.
129. Id. at 62–63 (noting the lengths to which researchers went to ensure subject anonymity
in the experiment).
130. Id. at 49–52.
131. Id. at 60–62.
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people’s willingness to forgo substantial financial gain to punish even
an anonymous Proposer whom they will never encounter again in
response to an unfair offer. Further research shows, moreover, that
Responders’ negative emotional reactions play a significant role in
132
their costly decisions to reject unfair offers. Therefore, innocent
defendants may be more likely than their guilty counterparts to react
in the manner exhibited in the ultimatum game and to reject what
they view as unfair plea offers.
A second way in which fairness-driven behavior may separate
the innocent from the guilty follows from the somewhat subtle
interaction among fairness perceptions and loss aversion. Unlike the
hypothetical rational actor of standard shadow-of-trial models, real
individuals tend to view alternative options—such as plea bargaining
versus trial—as positive or negative depending on whether the
alternative options appear to be better or worse than a
133
psychologically neutral reference point. Choice, in other words, is
134
reference dependent. Decision makers tend to be loss-averse: they
are not equally sensitive to positive and negative outcomes of similar
magnitudes, instead finding negative outcomes much more painful
135
than they find positive ones attractive.
The combination of reference dependence and loss aversion
leads people to react differently to the options available to them
depending on whether they view these options as gains or losses—a

132. Madan M. Pillutla & J. Keith Murnighan, Unfairness, Anger, and Spite: Emotional
Rejections of Ultimatum Offers, 68 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DEC. PROC. 208, 208, 220 (1996); see
also Armin Falk, Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, On the Nature of Fair Behavior, 41 ECON.
INQUIRY 20, 25 (2003) (“[R]esponders take into account not only the distributive consequences
of the proposer’s action but also the intention signaled by the action.”).
133. Cf. Rachlinski, supra note 101, at 119 (“Responses to a number of closely controlled
hypothetical scenarios demonstrate that the appeal of a settlement depends on whether the
settlement is characterized as a loss or as a gain.”).
134. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 277–80 (1979). Note also that prospect theory is only the most
famous member of a large family of models that seek a better descriptive fit by modifying some
rational-choice assumptions. See generally Chris Stramer, Developments in Nonexpected-Utility
Theory: The Hunt for a Descriptive Theory of Choice Under Risk, in ADVANCES IN
BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 104 (Colin F. Camerer, George Lowenstein, & Matthew Rabin eds.,
2004) (reviewing the development of such theories, how they fare in experimental tests, and
how they can be used).
135. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 134, at 280 (“With a single exception, utility
functions were considerably steeper for losses than for gains.”).
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136

phenomenon known as the “framing effect.” When facing the
prospect of gains, individuals usually are risk-averse, choosing, for
instance, a sure gain of $100 over the 50/50 prospect of receiving
either $200 or nothing. In both cases, the expected value of either
option is $100, but individuals overwhelmingly choose the certain
outcome over the option that includes the prospect of gaining
nothing. Yet typically the opposite attitude of risk seeking is
displayed when decision makers believe that they are facing the
prospect of a loss, so that they prefer, for example, an 80 percent
probability of losing $100 to a sure loss of $80, notwithstanding their
identical $80 expected values.
Notably, the effects of framing in legal settings have been
137
investigated in a number of civil litigation and settlement studies.
As in criminal cases, each party in civil litigation has to determine
whether it prefers the sure compromise outcome of a settlement to
the risky trial with its potential for either a better or a worse
138
outcome.
Prospect theory suggests that civil defendants’ risk
attitudes will depend on whether they view the trial-versus-settlement
139
decision as a choice between losses or between gains. For instance,
defendants who profited from a breach of contract and are being sued
for damages may compare both trial and settlement to the status quo,
140
view them as losses, and thus exhibit risk seeking. The same

136. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, 59 J. BUS. 251 (1986) (reviewing and explaining some of the evidence of the framing
effect).
137. See, e.g., Rachlinski, supra note 101, at 136–40 (providing a detailed account, including
experimental and observational evidence, of the potential role of framing in litigation and
settlement); see also Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U.
CHI. L. REV. 163, 185–87 (2000) (using some features of an advanced version of prospect theory
to explain frivolous litigation behavior); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology,
Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 121
(1997) (using framing to explain evaluations of settlement options by lawyers and clients).
138. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1984) (proposing an economic model that predicts when settlement
occurs in the shadow of trial); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis
Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 56–58
(1982) (proposing an economic model of litigation that accounts for allocation of costs).
139. See Rachlinski, supra note 101, at 121 (“[P]rospect theory predicts that people make
either risk-averse or risk-seeking choices depending upon the characterization of the decision as
a loss or as a gain.”). See generally id. (finding support for the effect of framing on settlement
decisions in both simulation studies and actual cases). For simplicity, our discussion sets aside
the significant issue of attorney fees, which also differ across legal systems.
140. See id. at 118–19 (“[D]efendants choose between accepting a sure loss by settling, and
accepting an uncertain but potentially worse outcome by litigating further. . . . [W]hen people
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defendants, however, would be risk-averse if they were to evaluate
these prospects in reference to their position before profiting from
the breach of contract, which makes both trial and settlement appear
141
as gains.
Framing may shape litigants’ risk attitudes not only by
determining whether trial and settlement appear as monetary losses
or gains, but also through defendants’ perceptions of fairness. When
judging fairness, the neutral reference point is what people perceive
as minimally fair; better outcomes are viewed as fair gains and worse
142
outcomes as unfair losses. Hence, people will tend to exhibit risk
aversion when choosing among fair outcomes but risk seeking when
143
facing unfair ones.
We have already seen that considerations of justice and fairness
loom large in criminal defendants’ plea bargaining decisions.
Innocents will tend to view the conviction and sanction required by
the plea as unfair and negative, views that encourage risk seeking. At
the same time, guilty defendants—insofar as they view conviction as a
fair, if undesirable, outcome and the discounted plea offer as a
positive outcome—will exhibit risk aversion. The interaction among
loss aversion, framing effects, and considerations of fairness may thus
reinforce the diverging plea attitudes of the innocent and the guilty,
with the former, more risk-seeking defendants rejecting plea offers
that the latter, risk-averse ones, find attractive.
Third and finally, defendants’ considerations of fairness may also
contribute to the diverging beliefs of the innocent and the guilty
regarding their trial prospects discussed in the preceding section. The
psychological literature reveals a number of ways in which
144
individuals’ preferences bias their judgments.
The effects of

choose among losses, they tend to make risk-seeking choices, preferring riskier outcomes over
sure losses.”).
141. See id. at 129 n.65 (“To be sure, one might argue that both parties in the hypothetical
[copyright-infringement suit] choose among gains, since they are essentially dividing the profits
made from the marketing materials protected by copyright.”).
142. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a
Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986)
(discussing framing effects in fairness judgments).
143. See Tor et al., supra note 68, at 104–07 (noting this phenomenon in the context of guilty
and innocent defendants).
144. See, e.g., Elisha Babad, Wishful Thinking and Objectivity Among Sports Fans, 2 SOC.
BEHAV. 231, at 237–38 (1987) (reporting participants’ biased predictions and estimates in the
direction of their preferences); Elisha Babad & Yosi Katz, Wishful Thinking—Against All Odds,
21 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1921, at 1931, 1934–35 (1991) (same); David V. Budescu & Meira
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phenomena such as wishful thinking or the desirability bias are strong
in situations in which people have a measure of control over
outcomes, as in the case of newlyweds’ predictions regarding the
145
future prospects of their marriage. But the evidence also reveals
that preferences bias expectations in settings that more closely
resemble the predicament of the criminal defendant at trial, in which
decision makers have limited or even no control over outcomes. For
example, people tend to overestimate the likelihood and degree of
success of the candidate or party that they favor in an election, the
team that they like better in a sports’ match, or the company in which
they have invested, despite the fact that their actions cannot exert any
146
effect on these outcomes. In a similar vein, innocent defendants’
strong negative reactions to the injustice of a plea bargain are likely
to bias their trial predictions more strongly than in the case of their
guilty counterparts.
The biasing effect of fairness preferences on defendants’ beliefs
may also operate through the affect heuristic, which allows people to
substitute affective “tags”—such as “good” or “bad”—that they
associate with the targets of judgment for a direct evaluation of these
147
targets. This heuristic simplifies judgmental processes by consulting

Bruderman, The Relationship Between the Illusion of Control and the Desirability Bias, 8 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 109, at 132 (1995) (same); Donald Granberg & Edward Brent,
When Prophecy Bends: The Preference-Expectation Link in U.S. Presidential Elections, 19521980, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 477, 477–79 & tbl.1 (1983) (same); Robert A. Olsen,
Desirability Bias Among Professional Investment Managers: Some Evidence from Experts, 10 J.
BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 65, 66–70 (1997) (same); Roy M. Poses & Michele Anthony,
Availability, Wishful Thinking, and Physicians’ Diagnostic Judgments for Patients with Suspected
Bacteremia, 11 MED. DECISION MAKING 159, 165–66 (1991) (same); George Wright & Peter
Ayton, Subjective Confidence in Forecasts: A Response to Fischhoff and McGregor, 5 J.
FORECASTING 117, 120–21 (1986) (same).
145. See Peter Harris, Sufficient Grounds for Optimism?: The Relationship Between
Perceived Controllability and Optimistic Bias, 15 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 9, 24–25 (1996)
(finding strong evidence of wishful thinking and the desirability bias in predictions of positive
events and finding weaker evidence of their existence in predictions of negative events); Neil D.
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 806, 808 (1980) (“[T]he greater the perceived controllability of a positive event, the
greater the tendency for people to believe that their own chances are greater than average.”
(emphasis omitted)).
146. See, e.g., Babad, supra note 144, at 237–38 (noting this phenomenon in the context of
sports); Babad & Katz, supra note 144, at 1931, 1934–35 (same); Granberg & Brent, supra note
144, at 477–79 & tbl.1 (noting this phenomenon in the political context).
147. Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES, supra note 119, at 49, 56–57 (noting that people subconsciously substitute affective
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readily available affective impressions. When it is employed,
evaluations depend on whether the assessed outcomes are tagged as
148
affectively positive or negative. For instance, studies suggest that
variations in the probability of different outcomes matter relatively
149
little when judgments are based on affective reactions. Moreover,
other research reveals that people rely on the affect heuristic when
150
assessing the risks and benefits of different activities. This reliance
on affect leads people erroneously to believe that activities they deem
to be beneficial, such as vaccinations, are also low-risk, while at the
same time considering activities that they dislike to be more risky
151
than they objectively are.
Thus, we speculate that innocent
defendants, who have a negative reaction to the plea offer, might
consider trial to be more attractive than it really is, either because the
affect heuristic leads them to overestimate the benefits of trial with its
potential for acquittal or because they insufficiently account for trial
152
risk altogether.
C. Experimental Evidence
The preceding sections document the extensive psychological
literature outside the plea-bargaining context that suggests that the
innocence effect may be caused by innocents’ more optimistic beliefs

judgments for stimuli, thereby responding to the general assessment of good or bad instead of to
the stimulus itself).
148. See Melissa L. Finucane, Ali Alhakami, Paul Slovic & Stephen M. Johnson, The Affect
Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 14 (2000) (“In
this way, judgments of risk and benefit are guided and linked by affect.”). See generally Paul
Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters & Donald G. MacGregor, The Affect Heuristic, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 119, at 397 (discussing
the reliance that humans place on affect when they make decisions).
149. See, e.g., Yuval Rottenstreich & Christopher K. Hsee, Money, Kisses, and Electric
Shocks: On the Affective Psychology of Risk, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI. 185, 188 (2001) (finding that
probability matters less in situations in which outcomes are affect rich); see also George F.
Loewenstein, Christopher K. Hsee, Elke U. Weber & Ned Welch, Risk as Feelings, 127
PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 276 (2001) (“Subsequent increments in probability (past zero) . . . have
little additional emotional impact and, presumably for this reason, have little impact on
choice.”).
150. See generally Slovic et al., supra note 148 (analyzing applications of the affect heuristic
in various situations).
151. See generally Finucane et al., supra note 148 (discussing the inverse relationship
between one’s perception of risk and one’s perception of benefit).
152. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV.
933, 942–43 (2006) (citing evidence of the role of the affect heuristic in the courtroom, in which
the likelihood of a decision that favors a given party may increase or decrease depending on the
affective reaction that the party generates in court).
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regarding their trial prospects or by their greater risk seeking
compared to the guilty, or by some combination of these two sets of
causes. For the purpose of developing plea-bargaining policy,
however, it is preferable to have more direct evidence of the
processes that underlie the innocence effect, a task to which realworld evidence is not well suited.
For instance, the field data provide indications that the Tulia
defendants’ refusals to bargain was at least partly driven by
153
considerations of justice and fairness. It is also possible—though not
at all certain—that at least the first eight defendants who refused to
engage in plea bargaining also were more optimistic regarding their
trial odds than guilty defendants in their positions would have been.
Insofar as the thirty innocents who faced trial after the first eight
defendants were convicted held fairness preferences similar to those
of their earlier counterparts, one might be tempted to attribute their
much higher plea-acceptance rate to a more realistic appraisal of their
odds, having seen the conviction and long prison sentences meted out
154
at trial to the defendants who preceded them. If this were the case,
however, defendants’ optimistic judgments would appear to be the
dominant driver of the innocence effect, fairness concerns
notwithstanding. Yet those later defendants also received
dramatically discounted offers, which could have made plea
bargaining attractive even for defendants holding biased beliefs
155
regarding their trial prospects.
Thus, even the highly informative Tulia dataset does not clarify
whether innocents truly are more optimistic than similarly situated
guilty defendants. Nor do these cases reveal whether fairness
preferences alone—in the absence of biased beliefs—suffice to
generate an innocence effect, particularly when conviction is not
virtually certain. Similarly, the plea bargaining studies discussed in
Part I.D provide some insight into the causes of the innocence effect
but still leave important questions unresolved.
To attempt to answer some of these questions, the authors and a
colleague conducted a series of experimental tests of fairness in plea

153. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text.
154. See BLAKESLEE, supra note 47, at 160 (“After . . . yet another maximum sentence,
defendants started pleading out in droves.”).
155. See id. (noting that the Tulia defendants began pleading because of “increasingly
reasonable offers from [the prosecutor,] McEachern, who seemed eager to get the whole affair
behind him”).
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156

bargaining, which inter alia examined the innocence effect. In these
experiments, we administered hypothetical questionnaires involving
lighter offenses to student participants, following the earlier research
that found the results of such studies to be commensurate with those
157
of more realistic simulations. Importantly, Tor et al.’s studies also
provided participants with precise information regarding their trial
prospects to avoid eliciting subjective probabilities of conviction and
to minimize the effects of those potential confounds that had been
158
encountered in previous studies.
After replicating the innocence effect in Study 1, using a simple
scenario concerning an academic violation and a mid-range, 60
159
percent conviction probability, we examined in Study 2 whether the
effect generalizes to a broader probability range and a different
160
scenario. Importantly, this second study also controlled for the
effect of the expected sanction at trial, holding all plea offers equal to
161
the expected sanction. This design made the results compatible with
shadow-of-trial models, and the design also made participants’
absolute risk attitudes transparent. Plea acceptance under these
conditions meant risk aversion, its rejection reflected risk seeking,
162
and indifference implied risk neutrality.
Sixty-four undergraduates from the University of Michigan
participated in an online survey that used a mixed design that
manipulated culpability between subjects (so that each participant
was either in the Guilty or the Innocent condition) as well as the
probability of conviction within subjects (so that each participant
163
considered five different probability levels). Participants read a
scenario about their involvement as drivers in a lethal car accident for
which they faced criminal charges and in which they personally knew
164
whether they had exceeded the speed limit. The participants also
156. See Tor et al., supra note 68, at 103–04 (explaining the setup and results of a test on the
.
effect that substantive fairness has on plea acceptance).
157. Houlden, supra note 70, at 279–85.
158. Tor et al., supra note 68, at 103–04.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 104–07.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 104. Note, however, that the experimental design aimed to examine the
systematic differences in risk attitudes between the innocent and the guilty. The experiment was
not designed to reach general conclusions about defendants’ absolute risk attitudes, which
depend on a multitude of factors well beyond the scope of the study.
163. Id. at 104–07.
164. Id. at 105.

GAZAY-AYAL & TOR IN PRINTER PROOF FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

THE INNOCENCE EFFECT

10/19/2012 2:02 PM

381

were told that the outcome of their trial depended on whether the
prosecution could prove that they had exceeded the speed limit. If the
prosecution succeeded in doing so, they would be convicted and given
a mandatory five-year suspension of their driver’s license; otherwise,
165
they would walk free.
Participants were then asked to decide whether they would
accept a plea bargain in five different circumstances. They were told
that “just before the trial, the prosecutor offers you a plea bargain: he
will drop the current charges if you will plead guilty to a lesser offense
166
that carries a significantly lighter sentence.”
At this point,
participants read their five plea offers, in which they were asked to
choose between going to trial—with a five-year sanction and a given
167
probability of conviction—and accepting the plea offer. In each
case, the sanction included in the bargain equaled the expected
168
sanction at trial. Participants then made a series of choices between
a 5 percent probability of receiving the full five-year suspension and a
three-month plea bargain; a 30 percent probability and an eighteen169
month offer; and so on.
In accordance with their main hypothesis, Tor et al. found that
innocents were more risk-seeking, overall, than their guilty
170
counterparts. The results also revealed a significant interaction
between guilt and probability of conviction, with innocents exhibiting
greater risk-seeking behavior for most, but not all, of the probability
range. From very low through low and intermediate probabilities of
conviction (5 percent, 30 percent, and 50 percent) approximately 30
percent fewer innocent than guilty participants accepted their plea
171
offers. The gap between the two groups narrowed, however, for the
higher (70 percent) conviction probability and disappeared
altogether—with innocents accepting slightly more plea offers—when
172
conviction probability was very high (95 percent).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. As the study noted, participants in the innocent condition tended to exhibit
significant risk seeking. They rejected the plea offer across almost all of the probability ranges,
with plea acceptance rates of only 17 percent, 7 percent, 20 percent, 43 percent, and 50 percent
for probability of conviction levels of 5 percent, 30 percent, 50 percent, 70 percent, and 95
percent, respectively. Guilty condition participants, on the other hand, were significantly more
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These findings contribute to our understanding of the innocence
effect in a number of respects. First, they provide evidence for the
effect when the subjective beliefs of innocent and guilty participants
are unlikely to diverge, in which circumstances the effect can be
attributed to the diverging preferences of the two defendant groups.
Second, the manifestation of the effect across most of the probability
range—particularly in a within-subjects design that allowed
participants to consider the different levels of conviction probability
and the different offers with identical expected values—suggests that
the innocence effect has broad relevance for shadow-of-trial models.
Third, the diminishing difference between innocent and guilty
defendants when conviction is likely and its later disappearance when
conviction is almost certain reveals a possible boundary to the
innocence effect. This pattern, in fact, is reminiscent of the behavior
of the later Tulia defendants, the great majority of whom chose to
plea bargain, despite their innocence, when faced with virtually
173
certain conviction and heavily discounted plea offers.
In addition, the Tor et al. study sought to shed further light on
the role of biased beliefs in the innocence effect, given that earlier
research had revealed that innocents tend to be more optimistic than
their guilty counterparts regarding their trial prospects, thereby
174
contributing to the innocence effect.
We hypothesized that
defendants’ fairness concerns may also lead them to develop biased
175
judgments of their culpability. Another study by Tor et al. used a
car accident scenario that included a condition in which the
176
defendants were uncertain about their culpability. As predicted, the
participants who did not know whether they had exceeded the speed
limit—and thus committed the offense with which they were
charged—behaved like their innocent counterparts, exhibiting the
177
same diminished willingness to accept plea offers.

risk averse, with plea acceptance rates of 47 percent, 38 percent, 56 percent, 53 percent, and 41
percent for the same five probability levels. Id. at 106.
173. See supra note 60 and the accompanying text.
174. Bordens, supra note 13, at 65–71; Gregory et al., supra note 13, at 1525.
175. Tor et al., supra note 68, at 110–11 (“[This study] tested the hypothesis that defendants
will exhibit egocentric assessments of culpability in plea bargaining. We expected participants
who are uncertain of their culpability to behave as if their plea offers were substantively
unfair.”).
176. Id. To increase the robustness of our measures, this study also used a different measure
of participants’ willingness to accept plea offers from that employed in the previous studies.
177. Id.
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The various experimental studies of plea bargaining thus not
only corroborate the field evidence of the innocence effect but also
offer further insight regarding its causes. In accordance with the
broader psychological literature, these studies reveal that the
innocence effect exists even when defendants know their objective
trial prospects. We may therefore infer that plea rejections can be
driven by the diverging preferences of innocent and guilty defendants
alone, at least when conviction is not highly likely or nearly certain. In
fact, fairness concerns appear to be strong enough to lead even
uncertain defendants—who know that they may in fact be guilty—to
form biased beliefs of their innocence and to reject objectively fair
plea offers as if they were innocent and as if the offers were
178
consequently unfair. More generally, however, innocents’ plea
reluctance is typically driven by their optimistically biased beliefs
179
regarding their trial prospects as well.
Altogether, therefore, our empirical and experimental findings
paint a plea-bargaining picture that differs in important respects from
what the shadow-of-trial models assume. Part III, therefore, turns to
examine the positive and normative implications for plea-bargaining
policy of the innocence effect and its causes.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Parts I and II documented the innocence effect and explored its
likely causes. Both field data and experimental studies revealed
innocents’ reluctance to plea bargain and suggested that this effect
results from the combination of innocents’ more optimistic
predictions of trial prospects and their aversion to accepting the
unjust outcomes of the plea bargain. This Part considers the positive
implications of the innocence effect in Part III.A, then continues in
Part III.B to study its normative implications for the extant plea
bargaining debate and beyond.
A. Positive Implications
1. The Cost of Innocence. The innocence effect imposes a
significant, collective cost on innocent defendants. Because of the
effect, innocents receive higher average sentences than guilty
defendants who face similar evidence and are charged with similar
178. Id.
179. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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offenses. This disparity occurs because guilty defendants more often
plea bargain and thereby reduce their average sentence.
To illustrate the cost of innocence, suppose that, in all cases with
an 80 percent conviction probability and a predicted imprisonment
sentence of ten years, the prosecution offers defendants a plea
bargain resulting in a five-year imprisonment—that is, a three-year
180
discount in prison time compared to the expected trial sentence. To
take the most extreme case, if all innocent defendants were to reject
this offer but all guilty defendants were to accept it, all of the guilty
defendants would be sentenced to five years. Eighty percent of the
innocents, however, would be convicted at trial and sentenced to ten
years in prison, whereas the remaining 20 percent would be acquitted.
Thus the average sentence imposed on an innocent in this example is
eight years in prison. Defendants who chose trial, therefore, are
sentenced to longer average sentences due to the combined impact of
plea bargaining and the innocence effect. In contrast, a legal system
without the plea-bargain mechanism would force all similarly situated
defendants to face trial and to receive the same average sentences
regardless of culpability. Of course, the same qualitative result still
holds for any scenario in which innocent defendants exhibit a
systematically greater reluctance to plea bargain than their guilty
counterparts, with the magnitude of the cost of innocence depending
on the strength of the innocence effect.
In fact, the above illustration likely understates the magnitude of
the cost of innocence. If defendants in this example only seek to
minimize the expected value of their punishment, the prosecution can
settle for a sentence discount of just over 20 percent to ensure that all
defendants with a 20 percent acquittal probability accept the offer. In
practice, however, the available empirical evidence suggests that
defendants generally are risk seeking: they will risk a higher expected
181
sentence to preserve the chance of a full acquittal. Plea-bargaining
prosecutors therefore must offer deeper sentence discounts, which
inadvertently impose an even greater collective penalty on those pleareluctant innocents.
Independently of the innocence effect, moreover, defendants
also differ in their willingness to accept plea offers due to their

180. The expected trial sentence is 10 years × 80% = 8 years.
181. Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2338–39; see also Birke, supra note 16, at 208–10 (“[T]he
most convincing basis for why defendants plead guilty despite loss aversion is that defendants
are risk seeking in the domain of losses . . . .”).
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idiosyncratic risk preferences and their assessments of their trial
prospects. Yet prosecutors in a budget-constrained system, which
brings to trial only approximately 5 percent of all criminal cases,
cannot make offers that attract only the average defendant because
those offers would be accepted only about half of the time. Instead, to
appeal to the vast majority of defendants, prosecutors must offer
significantly more lenient sentences than the expected punishment at
182
trial. Insofar as the innocence effect leads some innocents to reject
even these deeply discounted plea offers, the dynamics of plea
bargaining in a budget-constrained system thus further increase the
cost of innocence.
Somewhat ironically, the cost of innocence may be even more
dramatic in those cases in which the probability of acquittal is high.
Although prosecutors often decline to prosecute these weak cases,
when they do decide to bring charges they must often waive the
charges that likely would have resulted in imprisonment if the
defendants were convicted at trial. As a result, prosecutors must offer
non-incarceration sanctions, such as community service or probation,
183
when they make a plea offer. When faced with a high probability of
acquittal, therefore, plea-bargaining defendants enjoy a sentence that
is qualitatively different from and dramatically lighter than the
184
sentence imposed on their counterparts who are convicted at trial.
Consequently, the gap between the average punishment imposed on
the large majority of guilty pleaders, most of whom are guilty, and the
average sentence imposed on those few who plead not guilty,
amongst whom the innocent are overrepresented, is particularly large
185
in these cases.
182. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
183. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 60 (“When the case has a hole in it, however, the
prosecutor may scale the offer all the way down to probation.” (quoting Chicago defense
attorney J. Eugene Pincham)); Champion, supra note 8, at 257 (“Interviews with
several . . . prosecutors revealed that a primary consideration was securing a guilty plea to a
felonious charge. In weak cases, there was a tendency for them to recommend probation . . . in
exchange for a guilty plea from the defendant.”).
184. In the Tulia cases, for example, all of the defendants who were convicted after a trial
were sentenced to prison terms, whereas most of those who entered a guilty plea were
sentenced to other penalties. See supra Part I.C. Of course, it is difficult to know which penalty
would have been imposed absent the agreement. For this reason, it is difficult to establish
empirically that agreements that convert prison-term sentences to other punishments are
common.
185. Note also that our experimental findings suggest that the innocence effect is strongest
for medium-to-high acquittal probabilities, thereby further increasing the cost of innocence in
these circumstances. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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Finally, we should note that our examples refer to the cost of
innocence whenever there are both innocent and guilty defendants
who face similar conviction probabilities and similar anticipated
sentences upon conviction. We do not assert that innocent and guilty
defendants face similar average probabilities of conviction at trial.
Nonetheless, because prosecutors usually dismiss very weak cases, the
remaining defendants—whether innocent or guilty—face a substantial
186
risk of conviction. If all of these defendants were grouped according
to their probability of conviction, every resulting group of defendants
would have included some innocents together with many guilty
defendants. Because of the innocence effect, however, within each of
these groups those few innocents would bear higher average sanctions
187
than their guilty counterparts.
2. Guilty Bargainers. Innocent defendants who exhibit a
significantly greater aversion to pleading guilty than do their guilty
counterparts reject plea offers that the latter accept when faced with
similar trial prospects. But prosecutors, who cannot distinguish the
small innocent minority from the large guilty majority of those that
they decide to prosecute, must adjust their offers to secure plea
188
bargains with nearly all defendants. Consequently, plea offers are
inevitably geared towards the typical, guilty defendant, and are in fact
accepted by the great majority of the guilty, even as many innocent
defendants reject such offers. Plea bargains, therefore,
overwhelmingly lead to the conviction of the guilty.

186. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2309 (explaining why prosecutors often refrain from
bringing charges in weak cases); Jennifer F. Reinganum, Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial
Discretion, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 713, 719 (“[S]ufficiently weak cases . . . are dismissed.”).
187. Innocents are not evenly distributed across the spectrum of conviction probabilities,
and the evidence suggests that the magnitude of the innocence effect diminishes for very high
probabilities of conviction, see supra note 172 and accompanying text. Therefore, the magnitude
of the cost of innocence depends on the probability of conviction. Although the effect obtains
whenever the innocence effect is manifested, the cost of innocence may be less dramatic than it
might appear to be, due to the truth-revealing function of trial, which can distinguish between
the innocent and the guilty beyond the ability of prosecutors. Hypothetically, in cases in which
prosecutors judge that defendants face certain trial prospects based on the evidence (for
example, an 80 percent probability of conviction), innocents may face better prospects (for
example, 70 percent), whereas guilty defendants may face worse prospects (for example, 85
percent). The somewhat better trial prospects of innocent defendants may therefore partly
compensate for, and thus reduce, the magnitude of the cost of innocence.
188. Of course, prosecutors typically will not pursue charges against defendants whom they
believe to be innocent based on the available evidence.
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For instance, a plea offer that is accepted by the guilty 95 percent
of the time will be accepted by the innocent only in a substantially
smaller fraction of cases. Yet the ultimate proportion of innocents
among all guilty pleaders is even smaller than indicated by the
fraction of those among the innocents who accept the prosecutors’
offers. The innocents, after all, comprise only a small minority of all
criminal defendants to begin with, so it is a small proportion of that
small minority that will ultimately end up among the ranks of the
189
guilty pleaders.
Although the guilty tend to be overrepresented among plea
bargainers beyond their already high prevalence amid criminal
defendants generally, a closer look at our findings suggests three
possible limitations to this phenomenon. We found some tentative
evidence that innocents increasingly accept plea offers when they
believe that they are facing the death penalty, when they believe that
their conviction at trial is extremely likely, or when they have falsely
190
confessed during the police investigation.
The first limitation is straightforward: our provisionary evidence
indicates that the representation of the guilty among plea bargainers
in death-penalty cases might not exceed their proportion among
191
death-penalty defendants.
The second similarly implies that
innocents might plead guilty at rates closer to those of guilty
defendants when the prosecution’s case against them is particularly
192
strong. Importantly, however, for the innocence effect to disappear
under this circumstance, innocents must also believe that they are
193
facing nearly certain conviction, which may not happen often. In
other words, although innocents who form reasonably accurate
beliefs regarding their trial prospects may well behave like the guilty
when conviction is nearly certain, many over-optimistic innocents will
be reluctant to plead guilty even under this extreme condition. Hence,
the innocence effect still may be manifested, with the guilty
overrepresented—albeit to a lesser degree—among plea bargainers
who face nearly certain conviction. Finally, the third limitation
189. To illustrate, if innocent defendants were to comprise 1 percent of all defendants and
40 percent of these innocents were to accept plea offers that attract 95 percent of the guilty,
innocent defendants would represent only slightly more than 0.4 percent, or one out of
approximately 250, of all guilty pleaders.
190. See supra Part I.B–C.
191. See supra Part I.B.
192. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
193. See supra Part II.B.1.
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suggests that innocents who had falsely confessed during an
investigation may not exhibit plea behavior that is very different from
194
the behavior of the guilty.
3. Innocents on Trial. The immediate result of the innocence
effect for trial rates is the mirror view of its consequence for pleabargain rates. Many innocents—who tend disproportionately to reject
their plea offers—face a full trial, even as the dramatic majority of
cases involving guilty defendants are disposed of by plea bargain.
Therefore, a disproportionately significant fraction of innocent
defendants are among those criminal defendants on trial, with the
exact proportion depending on the respective rates of the guilty and
the innocent in the defendant population and the two groups’ relative
195
propensity for plea rejections.
Paralleling the analysis of the proportion of the guilty among
plea bargainers, our tentative evidence indicates that innocents’
representation in potential death-penalty trials might not be
substantially higher than their small base-rate proportion among such
196
cases to begin with. In the same vein, when conviction at trial is
nearly certain, some innocents will form reasonably accurate beliefs
regarding their trial prospects and will behave more like their guilty
counterparts, but other, optimistic innocents will be reluctant to plea.
Even under this extreme condition, a diminished innocence effect
may still exist, so that innocents may be overrepresented among those
defendants who choose trial, even when conviction is objectively very
197
likely. On the other hand, innocents who had falsely confessed to
the police might not be significantly overrepresented amongst those
defendants who are facing a full trial because we found that they
often plead guilty as well.

194. See supra text accompanying notes 37–38.
195. Using the proportions in the preceding illustration, supra note 189, for instance,
innocents would comprise about 11 percent of those criminal defendants facing a full trial.
196. See supra Part I.B.
197. Note, however, that although the base rate of innocents among defendants with an
extremely high probability of conviction is even smaller than their already small fraction of all
defendants, their overrepresentation among those who stand trial in these circumstances should
still amount to a noticeable absolute fraction. For example, if even 0.5 percent of the defendants
in these strong cases were innocent, but the guilty-plea rate of the innocent were 70 percent
while the guilty-plea rate of the guilty were 99 percent, then the innocent would still comprise
just under 13 percent of defendants in the jury trials in these cases.
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4. A Diminished Rate of Wrongful Convictions. Beyond its
effect on the proportions of the guilty among plea bargainers and the
innocent among those who stand trial, the innocence effect also
beneficially combines with plea bargaining to reduce the rate of
wrongful convictions, compared to a hypothetical criminal-justice
system that requires all defendants go through a full-fledged trial, for
at least two reasons. First and most importantly, without plea
bargaining, some guilty defendants who now plead guilty inevitably
would have been acquitted at trial, thereby increasing the rate of the
198
innocent among those convicted in court. The rate of wrongful
conviction is more important than the absolute number, for otherwise
we would randomly exonerate every second convict, assuring that the
number of wrongful convictions drops by half as the rate remains the
199
same.
Second, the plea bargains that are made with most defendants
free resources for the trials of those few defendants who contest the
charges, thereby improving the accuracy of these trials and allowing
for the provision of stronger protections for the innocent. If all
criminal proceedings led instead to full trials, resource constraints
would force the criminal-justice system to lower the cost—and thus
200
the quality—of trials to maintain a reasonable level of enforcement.

198. Because guilty defendants are overrepresented in the group of guilty pleaders as a
result of the innocence effect, forcing all guilty pleaders to opt for a jury trial will increase the
rate of guilty defendants at jury trials and thus would increase the rate of guilty defendants
acquitted.
199. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2310 (“Reducing the number of wrongful
prosecutions just by reducing the number of total prosecutions makes no more sense than
arbitrarily exonerating a random number of inmates, since some of them are likely to be
innocent.”); Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1934 (noting that a reduction in the number of
wrongful convictions without a corresponding reduction in their proportion is not socially
desirable).
200. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1932 (arguing that if plea bargaining were banned,
the increase in the number of trials would inevitably result in economizing the trials, which, in
turn, would lead to an increased number of errors). In fact, historical studies show that plea
bargains have evolved largely in response to the development of criminal defendants’ privileges
and rights. John H. Langbein, Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 261, 263–67 (1979). One can see a distinct connection between the expansion of
protections for defendants and the developing pressure to adopt plea bargaining in different
countries. Thus, in Italy, the transition from the inquisitorial method to the adversarial method
that gave the defendant several new legal rights at trial was accompanied by the infiltration of
plea bargains as a central component in the judicial system. William T. Pizzi & Mariangela
Montagna, The Battle To Establish an Adversarial Trial System in Italy, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 429,
439–42 (2004). In Germany, the increasing complexity of trials was a significant catalyst in the
development of plea bargains. Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations:
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Plea bargains leave the vast majority of defendants out of court,
thereby allowing the judiciary to ensure complex, costly, and
altogether higher-quality trials for those defendants who nevertheless
201
choose trial, including most innocents.
B. Normative Implications
Our findings on the innocence effect demonstrate that the
common assumption that culpability is irrelevant for plea behavior is
plainly mistaken. Not only does defendants’ willingness to accept plea
offers depend on their culpability, but the resulting plea-bargain and
trial rates are affected as well. This conclusion further reveals that the
related, near-universal scholarly belief that plea bargaining routinely
generates false guilty pleas is overstated, though not wholly
erroneous. Innocents are less likely to plead guilty than shadow-oftrial models assume, even in the face of attractive plea offers, except
possibly when they believe that conviction is extremely likely, when
they are facing the death penalty, or when they had falsely confessed
during the investigation.
Part III.A explained the positive implications of the innocence
effect under extant plea-bargaining practices. On the one hand, the
innocence effect combines with plea-bargaining practices to impose a
striking cost on innocent defendants, who bear higher average
202
sanctions than their similarly-situated guilty counterparts. On the
other hand, the effect also generates two significant benefits under
the current plea-bargaining regime: first, it brings about an
overrepresentation of the guilty among plea bargainers and the
203
innocent among those defendants who face full criminal trials;
second, the innocence effect causes a reduction in the rate of
wrongful convictions compared to a hypothetical system without plea
204
bargaining.
After examining the normative implications of these findings for
the positions of both supporters and detractors of plea bargaining,
this Part offers our own proposals for minimizing false convictions,

The Globalization of Plea-Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45
HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 45–46 (2004).
201. See supra note 200.
202. See supra Part III.A.1.
203. See supra Part III.A.2–3.
204. See supra Part III.A.4.
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better protecting the innocent, and improving the plea bargaining
process altogether by accounting for the innocence effect.
1.
Plea Detraction for Plea Supporters.
Plea-bargaining
proponents emphasize the legitimate interest of innocents in
minimizing their individual harm. Plea bargains provide an
alternative to the costly and risky trial, during which innocents may
be detained or suffer other restrictions, and at the end of which they
may even face a harsh, undeserved penalty. In the eyes of many
supporters of the practice, the important insurance that plea
bargaining provides to those willing innocents should not be revoked
in the name of protecting innocent defendants generally, in the
205
abstract.
Our findings should give pause to these plea-bargaining
supporters for a number of related reasons. For one, our analysis
reveals that the insurance provided by plea bargaining predominantly
benefits the guilty, who tend to accept plea offers, rather than the
innocent, who more often refuse the plea and choose to face trial
206
instead. In fact, the experimental evidence tentatively indicates that
the innocence effect may be particularly pronounced in cases with a
low-to-intermediate probability of conviction, although further
207
research is needed to establish the robustness of this finding. If
further research confirms our findings, then the same conditions of
greater variance in trial outcomes that make the insurance function of
plea bargaining particularly valuable—that is, when both conviction
and acquittal are quite plausible—also incline innocent defendants
more often to reject this insurance. Similarly, although there are some
indications that the significance of the innocence effect may diminish
when conviction is nearly certain, this is precisely the circumstance in
which the insurance function of plea bargaining also is least valuable.
Plea-bargaining supporters might respond that plea bargaining
still provides insurance-like benefits to some innocents, namely the
205. See Bowers, supra note 12, at 1120–21 (claiming that plea bargains are especially
beneficial to innocent defendants); Church, Jr., supra note 12, at 515–16 (critiquing Professor
Alschuler’s objection to plea bargaining with innocents, Alschuler, supra note 3); Robert E.
Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bargains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent
Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2013 (1992) (“[Professor Schulhofer, supra note 6,] attacks our
analysis because we want innocent defendants to be able to plead, if they so choose, under the
best possible terms. In Schulhofer’s view, they are better off going to trial, whether they think so
or not.”).
206. See supra Part III.A.2.
207. See supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text.
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ones who derive the greatest insurance value from the plea offer and
therefore choose plea over trial despite the innocence effect.
Moreover, offering the plea option to innocent defendants guarantees
that the many innocents who refuse to plea are consciously taking the
risk of wrongful conviction at trial. But our analysis further shows
that plea rejections typically reflect not only innocents’ fairnessdriven preferences but also a systematic, optimistic bias regarding
208
their trial prospects. Therefore, if they were unbiased, at least some
innocents who presently refuse to plea bargain would accept their
plea offers. These defendants unwittingly give up the insurance of the
plea bargain that their guilty counterparts routinely enjoy and instead
face a significant trial risk against their own risk preferences.
The cost of innocence, however, poses an even more significant
problem for plea proponents, who primarily aim to minimize
209
innocents’ actual individual harm.
The combination of plea
bargaining and the innocence effect imposes higher average penalties
on innocents than on guilty defendants who face similar conviction
probabilities and sentences upon conviction. Because innocent
defendants receive harsher average sentences, for instance, the
proportion of innocent inmates in prison at any given time is higher
than it would have been absent plea bargaining. Yet this collective
harm to innocent defendants would not occur in a no-plea system,
which avoids the disproportional selection of guilty defendants to
plea bargaining and innocent defendants to trial. Paradoxically,
therefore, the goal of harm minimization that traditionally is so
important to plea-bargaining supporters may be better served by the
restriction—rather than the encouragement—of plea bargaining.
2. Plea Support for Plea Detractors. Opponents often argue that
plea bargaining is wrong because it puts pressure on innocent
defendants falsely to plead guilty and thereby facilitates wrongful
convictions, an assumed phenomenon that is also known as the
210
“innocence problem.” In fact, plea detractors typically assert that
society must not consciously embrace a procedure that facilitates false

208. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
210. For discussion of the innocence problem in plea bargaining, see Russell D. Covey,
Signaling and Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 73, 77–83 (2009);
Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2297; Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1981; and supra note 11 and
accompanying text.
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guilty pleas, the individual preferences of those falsely pleading
211
defendants who wish to avoid the risk of trial notwithstanding.
The argument against false pleading is based in part on society’s
212
moral obligation to prevent wrongful convictions, an obligation
familiarly manifested by statements to the effect that “[b]etter that
213
ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.” Plea
bargains are said to violate this principle because they lead to the
conviction of some innocents who would have been acquitted in
214
court.
Furthermore, plea-bargaining opponents assert that
knowingly convicting the innocent—as they assume plea bargaining
routinely does—is morally wrong, irrespective of the direct costs of
215
trials for the innocent and for society at large. According to this
view, forcing all defendants to face the risk of a harsher sentence at
trial is morally preferable to guaranteeing some wrongful convictions
216
through guilty pleas. Hence, plea-bargaining detractors argue that
although those inevitably imperfect trials sometimes produce
wrongful convictions, it is important for such occasional unjust results
to follow a genuine effort on the part of the criminal-justice system to
217
get to the truth.
211. See Alschuler, supra note 11, at 714 (criticizing plea bargaining for yielding a larger
number of wrongful convictions than trial); Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 1986 (“A large body of
legal doctrine attests to the importance of assuring that innocents will not be convicted, whether
or not they themselves would prefer to avoid the risks of a high sentence after trial.”).
212. See A.A.S. ZUCKERMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 125 (1989) (“The
protection of the innocent from conviction is a central theme of the law of criminal
evidence. . . . The importance of protecting the innocent from conviction is not justified only on
the basis that it will produce the best social results.”); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970) (“It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.”).
213. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. Note that the 1:10 ratio is not
universally accepted. Historically, scholars offered numerous alternative ratios to better reflect
the balance between the interest in convicting the guilty and the need to insure the acquittal of
the innocent. For a review of the different opinions on this matter, see generally Alexander
Volokh, Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997).
214. See Alschuler, supra note 3, at 60 (“[A] more serious criticism . . . is that the greatest
pressures to plead guilty are brought to bear on defendants who may be innocent.”); Schulhofer,
supra note 6, at 1985 (“[C]onviction of the innocent produces serious negative externalities.”).
215. See DWORKIN, supra note 124, at 72 (“People have a profound right not to be
convicted of crimes of which they are innocent. . . . [I]t would be no justification or defense that
convicting [an innocent] person would spare the community some expense or in some other way
improve the general welfare.”).
216. See supra note 211.
217. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 11, at 714 (“A procedure that is designed to determine
who is guilty and who is innocent seems almost certain to accomplish this task more effectively
than a procedure that is deliberately designed to evade the issue.”).
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Notably, plea-bargaining opponents also place a much higher
value on reducing the rate, or proportion, of wrongful convictions
among convictions overall than they do on reducing the severity of
the sentences meted out to those unfortunate innocents who are still
wrongfully convicted. Scholars in this camp, for example, find it
morally preferable that only a single innocent defendant rather than
ten innocents be convicted, even if the punishment inflicted on the
single innocent equals the punishment that would have been meted
218
out to all of the latter ten together.
Yet our findings reveal how the same considerations that
historically were employed to criticize plea bargains suggest that this
practice is less problematic than previously believed—maybe even
socially beneficial—for two related reasons. First, the innocence
effect means that plea bargainers are predominantly guilty, while
innocents disproportionately refuse the plea and go to trial, which
might result in their acquittal. Second, the innocence effect also
combines with plea bargaining to diminish the rate of wrongful
convictions when compared to the all-trial system traditionally
219
preferred by those opposed to plea bargaining. In other words,
because of the innocence effect, plea bargains lead to beneficial,
lower rates of wrongful convictions.
Altogether, therefore, our findings reveal that insofar as the rate
of wrongful conviction is the relevant normative yardstick, the harm
of plea bargains is smaller and their benefits are greater than
previously believed.
3. Restrictions on Plea Offers.
The preceding analysis
demonstrates that the innocence effect at least weakens the
traditional arguments of both camps in the plea-bargaining
controversy, even if it does not mandate the actual reversal of their
respective attitudes towards the practice. Because of the innocence
effect, plea bargains impose a significant collective cost on innocents
and promote the interests of most innocents much less than pleabargaining supporters assert. But neither do plea bargains increase
the rate of wrongful convictions, as some plea-bargaining opponents
argue. Yet perhaps intermediate solutions—between the polar

218. See, e.g., id. (arguing that a system that convicts ten innocent defendants and sentences
each of them to one year of imprisonment is worse than a system that mistakenly convicts one
defendant at trial and sentences him to ten years).
219. See supra Part III.A.4.
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opposites of the absolute freedom to make plea offers practiced today
and a complete ban on plea bargaining—may help simultaneously to
minimize wrongful convictions and harm to those convicted
innocents.
One way to reduce the negative effect of plea bargaining on the
sentences of wrongfully convicted innocents is to limit the magnitude
220
of plea discounts or, alternatively, of trial penalties. The law could
instruct judges to reject plea agreements that include a sentence that
is significantly lower than the sentence expected following conviction
by a jury trial. This curtailment of prosecutors’ ability to offer
significant sentence discounts will result in plea rejections by those
defendants who require deeper discounts in exchange for their guilty
pleas. Because the innocent are less willing to plead guilty and hence
221
only accept plea offers with large sentence discounts, the proportion
of innocents among those who plead guilty will be reduced, as will the
number and rate of wrongful convictions. At the same time,
moreover, the lower trial penalty guarantees a reduction in the
222
problematic cost of innocence.
Although the main normative goal of plea opponents is to reduce
the rate of wrongful convictions, plea proponents predominantly are
concerned with reducing the sentences that are imposed on convicted
innocents. Yet restricting the guilty-plea discount also will minimize
the gap between sentences meted out to those who opt for a trial—
including a large proportion of the innocent—and those imposed on
guilty pleaders, whose ranks are dominated by the guilty. Of course,
the cost of innocence will not completely disappear even with such
restrictions because innocents who are wrongfully convicted by a jury
220. See Alschuler, supra note 2, at 1127 (supporting a fixed-discount system for guilty pleas
to ensure that weak cases would result in a trial); Wright, supra note 4, at 111 (arguing for
“practices that offer only modest plea discounts to defendants” to increase the confidence in
criminal convictions); Douglas D. Guidorizzi, Comment, Should We Really “Ban” Plea
Bargaining?: The Core Concerns of Plea Bargaining Critics, 47 EMORY L.J. 753, 781–82 (1998)
(suggesting that the plea-bargaining process be replaced by a system that relies on fixed, written
sentencing discounts).
221. See supra Part II.B.
222. A similar proposal previously was offered by one of us as a means of discouraging
prosecutors from filing charges in weak cases. See Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2313–30
(arguing that partially banning plea bargaining would encourage prosecutors to refrain from
bringing weak cases but not strong cases). But the suggestion in this Article has a different goal:
by restricting guilty plea discounts, the law can reduce both the number of innocent defendants
who plead guilty and their proportion among all guilty pleaders. Such a restriction, moreover,
would not be detrimental to plea bargaining generally because it would still allow prosecutors to
bargain with most guilty defendants.
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will still be sentenced to longer average terms than guilty pleaders.
But the gap between the two groups will shrink.
Practically speaking, imposing limits on sentence bargains would
not be particularly difficult. Courts could be instructed to reject plea
bargains if the proposed sentence is substantially lower than that
223
imposed in similar circumstances following a full trial. On the other
hand, limiting charge bargaining or fact bargaining is much harder,
because the parties can often justify the changes in charges and facts
on an evidentiary basis. Nevertheless, even charge-bargaining
restrictions might still be effective if courts were instructed to reject
plea agreements unless the remaining charges “adequately reflect the
224
seriousness of the actual offense behavior.” Of course, prosecutors
still could find ways to continue making charge bargains on the sly,
but most prosecutors likely would abide by the rules if they were
instructed to expose the details of each plea agreement, which would
225
allow courts to review charge bargaining as well.
4. Agreements on a Simplified Criminal Process. Another
alternative that may satisfy the interests of both camps in the pleabargaining debate involves bargaining for a simplified criminal
process, an option that scholars previously offered to address other
226
The law could
concerns with extant plea-bargain practices.
encourage parties to substitute, in return for a sentence discount, a
shorter, simplified process for plea-bargain agreements. For instance,
227
parties could agree on a bench trial in place of a jury trial. Similarly,
they could agree that the defendant will testify before the prosecution
presents its case. Or they could make other stipulations that reduce
the cost of trial for the prosecution. We speculate that innocent
defendants will be more willing to forego some of their procedural

223. Id. at 2341.
224. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6B1.2(a) (2004); accord Gazal-Ayal, supra
note 41, at 2340–41; see also Oren Bar-Gill & Oren Gazal-Ayal, Plea Bargains Only for the
Guilty, 49 J.L. & ECON. 353, 360 (2006) (“[T]he prevention of charge and fact bargaining is
crucial to the efficacy of any sentencing guidelines . . . .”).
225. For a detailed description of such an approach, see Gazal-Ayal, supra note 41, at 2340–
41.
226. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037,
1087–93 (1984) (proposing a bench-trial discount as an alternative to guilty-plea discounts); see
also John Langbein, Land Without Plea Bargaining: How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV.
204, 225 (1979) (proposing the adoption of the German simplified trial methods as an
alternative to plea bargaining).
227. Schulhofer, supra note 226, at 1087–93.
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rights in return for a lower expected sentence than to plead guilty, so
228
long as they can maintain their innocence throughout the process.
Of course, a simplified process has some disadvantages. Most
notably, it may offer defendants a lower probability of acquittal
compared to a full jury trial with its additional protections. And, more
generally, a simplified process might increase the likelihood of error
229
compared to a full-fledged trial. On balance, however, the many
benefits of agreements on a simplified process with respect to both
wrongful convictions and harm to convicted innocents outweigh their
disadvantages.
First, simplified procedures will promote the interest of innocent
defendants in obtaining sentence discounts while still allowing them
to benefit from a real legal process, aimed at finding the truth.
Indeed, although the cost of simplified procedures is higher than that
of a traditional guilty plea, the cost gap between the two is smaller in
a substantially simplified process. Additionally, most guilty
defendants who currently plead guilty will continue to do so even
230
when offered the option of a simplified process. After all, to be
acquitted in a simplified procedure, guilty defendants would still have
to lie to the judge, something most defendants likely find to be
psychologically difficult, particularly in the common scenario in which
231
lying probably will not overcome conclusive evidence. In addition,
the prosecution typically has very strong cases. Therefore, guilty
defendants would tend to avoid even the small personal and
232
monetary cost of a simplified trial. We already discussed the finding,
moreover, that most guilty defendants report after the fact that they
233
had made a guilty plea simply because they were guilty.
Second, some innocent defendants who would have opted for
trial—absent another alternative to plea bargaining—would now
probably choose a simplified procedure. Because these procedures

228. This dynamic may well be facilitated by innocents’ optimistic beliefs regarding the trial
process. See supra note 208 and accompanying text.
229. See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 4, at 1932 (“Reducing the process, in turn, logically
implies increasing the rate of error.”).
230. See Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 942–45 (1983) (arguing that
guilty-plea rates would still be high in the absence of plea bargaining).
231. Id. For reasons defendants give for pleading guilty, see supra notes 23–26 and
accompanying text.
232. Alschuler, supra note 230, at 944.
233. See supra notes 23, 26 and accompanying text.
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are cheaper than full trials, however, judicial resources will be spared.
These resources could be channeled toward implementing a
simplified process that is more beneficial to innocents than plea
bargaining is, thereby advancing innocents’ interests without
requiring additional resources.
Third, simplified procedures may reduce wrongful convictions.
Despite the reluctance of many innocents to plead guilty, some still
do so, either because they desire to end their criminal proceeding
quickly or because they fear the harsher consequences of a wrongful
jury conviction. Yet a simplified procedure could provide these
innocents with the opportunity to challenge the charges against them
in a setting that diminishes their concerns about a lengthy procedure
or a dramatically harsher sanction.
Finally, even in cases in which a simplified process occasionally
would lead to a wrongful conviction, the moral gravity of this
undesirable outcome would be smaller, having followed an honest
judicial attempt to find the truth. Notably, studies on procedural
fairness indicate that even defendants who are dissatisfied with trial
outcomes tend to accept those outcomes if they had been given an
opportunity to argue their case before an impartial arbiter before the
234
verdict. In fact, simplified procedures might provide defendants
with an even better opportunity to present their story than the
235
adversarial jury trial can.
CONCLUSION
This Article marshals forth evidence of the innocence effect,
which is the systematically greater reluctance of innocents to plea
bargain compared to guilty defendants. Part II shes some light on the
causes of this effect, showing that it typically results from a
combination of innocents’ greater optimism regarding their trial
prospects and their increased risk seeking compared to guilty
defendants, and occasionally from asymmetric information as well.
Part III examines the implications of the innocence effect and its
234. Cf., e.g., Tyler, supra note 18, at 119 (“[P]eople’s assessments of the fairness of thirdparty decision-making procedures shape their satisfaction with their outcomes. . . . [W]hen
third-party decisions are fairly made people are more willing to accept them voluntarily.”
(citation omitted)).
235. In general, criminal law effectively encourages defendants not to tell their story and
choose to remain silent. See generally Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal
Defendants, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449 (2005) (describing and critiquing the incentives provided by
the criminal-justice system that enable the silencing of defendants).
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causes. We reveal the striking cost of innocence: the innocence effect
combines with extant plea-bargain practices to impose harsher
sanctions on the average innocent compared to the average guilty
among defendants facing similar charges and conviction probabilities.
At the same time, our analysis also shows how the innocence effect
combines with plea bargaining to produce the beneficial consequence
of reducing the rate of wrongful convictions when compared to a
hypothetical criminal-justice system in which trial is the only option.
Finally, Part III also explains how these findings require both pleabargaining opponents and its proponents to reevaluate their
traditional positions. Opponents, whose traditional hostility toward
the practice is based on their belief that plea bargaining facilitates
wrongful convictions, should actually support the practice.
Conversely, proponents, who emphasize innocents’ interest in the
lighter sentences that are offered by plea bargains, should oppose this
practice that predominantly and disproportionately benefits the guilty
because it imposes a collective cost on those trial-bound innocents.
We conclude with our own proposals for minimizing false convictions,
better protecting the innocent, and improving the plea-bargaining
process altogether by accounting for the innocence effect.
Empirical research on the factors that shape plea-bargaining
decision making is in its infancy. Even with respect to the innocence
effect, plea-bargaining policy would greatly benefit from further
empirical evidence that would help to quantify the relative magnitude
of the effect under different circumstances in the defendant
population. We still need to learn, for instance, whether the type or
cause of defendants’ innocence impacts the reluctance to plea
bargain. That is, defendants charged with a crime they did not commit
may well react differently from those whose innocence stems from the
absence of a required mental component or from the existence of a
legal defense to the charges. We have only established the innocence
effect with respect to the first of these categories of innocence.
Another important topic for future study is whether the nature
of the evidence against them affects defendants’ willingness to plead
guilty. Our exoneration database indicated, for example, that
defendants who falsely confess to the police also demonstrate a
236
greater tendency to plead guilty in court. We already noted,
however, that this pattern sheds no light on whether these guilty pleas
were facilitated by the earlier false confession or if both the
236. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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confession and the guilty plea were manifestations of some other case
237
characteristic, such as a defendant who is particularly vulnerable.
Similarly, there is room for additional research on the impact of
the strength of the evidence that a defendant is facing on the
innocence effect. Our tentative findings—from the behavior of the
later Tulia defendants and from one experimental test—suggest that
the innocence effect significantly diminishes when the probability of
238
conviction is extremely high. But this important possibility requires
further exploration and corroboration.
Finally and related, plea-bargaining policy would benefit from
learning whether factors that have been shown more generally to
increase defendants’ willingness to plead guilty, such as the pressure
239
exerted by one’s defense attorney, impact the guilty and the
innocent differently. One particularly pervasive factor in this
category, for example, is the time that defendants spend in pretrial
detention, which multiple studies have linked to an increased
240
willingness to plea bargain. Unsurprisingly, moreover, the effect of
detention appears to be especially strong when defendants are
charged with a misdemeanor offense and the prosecution offers an

237. See supra note 37.
238. One experimental study showed that the willingness among the guilty to accept plea
bargains does not change when the chances for conviction rise from 50 percent to 90 percent,
whereas among the innocent the difference is much more significant. Bordens, supra note 13, at
67. Another study found that when the chance of conviction is extremely high, the difference in
the willingness to accept a plea bargain between the innocent and the guilty nearly disappears.
Tor et al., supra note 68, at 106.
239. For a review of the different ways in which attorneys influence defendants’ decisions
and actions, see Alschuler, supra note 14, at 1191–95. An extensive field study of this issue
showed that a substantial number of defendants that refused to plead guilty changed their minds
at the last minute following their attorney’s advice. JOHN BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE,
NEGOTIATED JUSTICE: PRESSURES TO PLEAD GUILTY 39–56 (1977).
240. E.g., Gail Kellough & Scot Wortley, Remand for Plea: Bail Decisions and Plea
Bargaining as Commensurate Decisions, 42 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 186, 198 (2002); William M.
Landes, Legality and Reality: Some Evidence on Criminal Procedure, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 287,
329–69 (1974). When defendants are detained, they have a greater incentive to end the
proceedings quickly. In a field study that examined inconsistent admissions among women
prisoners, the results revealed that the desire to end the pretrial detention was one of the main
reasons that the prisoners accepted a plea bargain. See DELL, supra note 23, at 31–32. Even if
they were not arrested, many defendants would be willing to accept a plea bargain to save
themselves the ongoing legal proceeding. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT 195 (1992) (“Even if [the
defendants] have free counsel, the time and effort necessary to mount a defense can quickly
come to outweigh the magnitude of the sanction that the defendant is seeking to avoid.”).
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immediate release from jail in a plea bargain for time served. The
limited available data on this form of plea bargaining indicates that
the practice is widespread. For example, in New York City more than
5 to 12 percent of felony arrestees who are convicted are sentenced to
242
243
time served, almost always following a guilty plea. For some
misdemeanors, moreover, the frequency of time-served sentences is
244
much higher. Again, however, the extant evidence in this area fails
to distinguish between innocent and guilty defendants. Yet we
speculate that extremely attractive offers of immediate release for
time served may well diminish the innocence effect in a pattern
resembling the behavior of the later Tulia innocents—who nearly all
pleaded guilty when they faced extremely attractive plea offers in
245
light of a certain conviction and heavy sanctions at trial.
The early stage of empirical plea-bargaining research
notwithstanding, the significant evidence of the innocence effect
presented here makes it apparent that the legal literature’s reliance
on the shadow-of-trial model is excessive. Thus, apart from the
important positive and normative implications developed here, this
Article serves to illustrate both the great benefits of and the need for
further empirical studies of plea bargaining, the institutional practice
responsible for the overwhelming majority of criminal convictions.
241. See HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 47–48 (1982) (describing the
pressure on defendants in pretrial detention to plead guilty and gain immediate release); Bibas,
supra note 3, at 2493 (“[P]retrial detention places a high premium on quick plea bargains in
small cases, even if the defendant would probably win acquittal at an eventual trial.”).
242. DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., N.Y. STATE, NEW YORK STATE: ADULT ARRESTS
DISPOSED (2012), available at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/nys.pdf.
243. Guilty pleas account for more than 99 percent of convictions in the courts in New York
City. CRIMINAL COURT OF THE CITY OF N. Y. ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 18 (2012), available at
http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/criminal/AnnualReport2011.pdf (showing that only 291
convictions resulted from jury trials while 135,474 resulted from guilty pleas). This phenomenon
of course is not limited to New York City, as shown by Bureau of Justice data, although further
discussion of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of the present analysis. See Type of Pretrial
Release or Detention of Felony Defendants in the 75 Largest Counties, UNIV. AT ALBANY,
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5552006.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2012) (providing that
37 percent of felony defendants are held until disposition on bail and that 5 percent are held
without bail).
244. See MICHELE SVIRIDOFF, DAVID B. ROTTMAN & ROB WEIDNER WITH FRED
CHEESMAN, RANDALL HANSEN, BRIAN J. OSTROM & RICHARD CURTIS, DISPENSING JUSTICE
LOCALLY: THE IMPACTS, COST AND BENEFITS OF THE MIDTOWN COMMUNITY COURT 2.21–
2.24 (2002) (reporting rates as high as 53 percent for certain offenses).
245. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. Note, however, that the behavior of
defendants like Kelly Jarrett and Kerry Max Cook, discussed supra note 29, provides anecdotal
evidence that some level of the innocence effect remains even in serious cases in which
defendants are offered the opportunity to plead guilty in exchange for time served.

